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Focus and research questions 
The object of this thesis is to study the process of democratization in Mozambique and 
the role that education for citizenship can play in this context. Prior to focusing on the 
concept of education for citizenship, however, I need to outline and discuss the context 
within which this education is to be placed. Hence, I need to explore the contemporary 
Mozambican society, and the historical events contributing to the present level of 
democracy in the country. At present, the development aid agents play a decisive part 
in the development of Mozambique. I therefore also intend to investigate the 
partnership between Mozambique and its donors. This constitutes a thesis of three 
connected and overlapping research questions, two of which are subordinate to the last 
one. These are as follows: 
I will first investigate the present Mozambican democracy by focusing on the 
country’s recent history, and I explore my first research question: 
What characterizes the present Mozambican democracy and the transition it goes 
through? 
I then explore the aid relationship between Mozambique and its donors and some 
trends in the development aid policy. The main focus will be on the dilemma of 
conditionalities within the development aid partnership, as I address my next research 
question:  
What characterizes the development aid partnership in this context?  
By investigating these two sub questions, I intend to provide a basis for the 
understanding of the main concern of this thesis. It is of interest to explore what role 
education for citizenship could play, and which role it does play, in the context of 
democratization in Mozambique. This is the focus of my final and main research 
question: 
Which role does education for citizenship play in the Mozambican context? 
All questions will be explored through a combination of theoretical and empirical 
sources. 
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Methodology 
This study is a case study that consists of one theoretical part of literature studies and 
one empirical part of qualitative interviews from my fieldwork in Mozambique. The 
methodological implications are discussed in chapter 2. The literature review is 
outlined in chapters 3-6: Mozambique’s history is outlined to provide an understanding 
of the present conditions for democratization (chapter 3). The aid relationship and its 
inherent dilemma of conditionality are discussed (chapter 4). The term democracy and 
the problem of its transfer are considered, and the concept of education for citizenship 
is discussed (chapters 5 and 6, respectively). This theoretical outline constitutes a 
beginning of the discussions concerning my research questions, which are additionally 
addressed through the analysis of empirical data in chapter 7.  
My empirical data were collected during a field study in Mozambique. By a 
convenience sample I conducted 15 qualitative semi-structured and open-ended 
interviews. They have been analyzed according to categories detected in the theoretical 
material and in the empirical data itself. 
Sources and data 
This study draws on a variation of different disciplines: The historical outline and the 
democracy theory are part of the tradition of political science; the discussions 
concerning education are within the tradition of science of education, and partly 
relying on the subject area of critical pedagogy. The outline of the aid relationship is 
based on the growing amount of literature on the field, as well as other research done 
on the field of education and development in Mozambique. I have additionally made 
use of international and national policy documents and statistics. 
The empirical data have been collected through my interviews with different 
stakeholders within the education sector in Mozambique. This data rely on information 
received from the government and governmental institutions, universities, international 
and bilateral development aid partners and representatives for civil society -mainly 
non-governmental institutions working with democratization and/or education in 
Mozambique. 
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Conclusions 
In a study like this, clear and straightforward conclusions are difficult to uphold. There 
are nevertheless some tendencies that I have found interesting. When exploring my 
first research question What characterizes the present Mozambican democracy and the 
transition it goes through?, I have support from literature studies when claiming that 
Mozambique’s present democracy is characterized by people’s lack of democratic 
experience. My empirical data show similar results, as there are many obstacles to 
democracy in the present Mozambican society that might be explained through this 
lack of democratic experience. I argue that this lack of democratic experience leads to 
a need for information and increased participation, and that education for citizenship 
could play an important role here.  
When it comes to the concrete transition into democracy, the term democracy is first 
emphasised in the literature review. Democracy theorists have divergent 
understandings of the term, and it can be applied differently to different contexts. 
There are implications of the African context that need to be taken into consideration 
when a democracy is to be created in Mozambique. Nevertheless, my empirical data 
show that the Mozambican transition into democracy can in many ways be 
characterized as a pure transfer of a Western-type democracy. My informants lament 
this and appeal for a democracy adjusted to the Mozambican context.  
This democracy-transfer is maintained partly through the conditionalities tied to aid. 
The donor community has a powerful impact on the Mozambican society, and this 
brings me to my second research question: What characterizes the development aid 
partnership in this context? There is no doubt that the external partners can play an 
important role in encouraging and securing a democratic development. But literature 
shows that development aid is an issue of great controversies, as conditionalities are 
part and parcel of the development aid relationship. I have studied the education sector, 
and the new Sector Wide Approach (SWAp) is warmly welcomed in this context. It 
seems to entail positive features that deals with some of the problems inherent in the 
aid relationship, to provide good means for democratization. But this depends on 
whether the development aid partnership functions according to its intentions, and 
reality shows that it does not. My empirical data concord with this: my informants 
view the SWAp as positive for the creation of a genuine partnership. But they also 
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point to a lot of difficulties within the SWAp. There are divergent understandings and 
cultural differences within the partnership. Conditionalities are present, and a lack of 
trust characterizes the relationship. One might question to what degree one can call this 
relationship democratic, and a genuine partnership. This situation illustrates the need 
for increased Mozambican ownership to policy planning, and increased participation 
by the ordinary Mozambicans. I argue that education for citizenship could be 
instrumental in this respect.  
Through the discussions concerning my two first research questions, I have provided a 
basis understanding for the exploration of my last research question. I have argued that 
the Mozambican democracy is still not consolidated, that the development aid 
partnership does not necessarily contribute positively in this context, and that 
education for citizenship could be instrumental in this situation. The question is, 
however, what this concept of education for citizenship could be, and how it functions 
in Mozambique. Hence, my final and main research question becomes: Which role 
does education for citizenship play in the Mozambican context? The theoretical outline 
provided shows that there are at least two aspects of education relevant in this context. 
Education for citizenship will include socialization into the political culture of a 
democratic society, through conveyance of common values. This is important, as 
education for citizenship plays a role when it comes to nation building, especially in a 
multiethnic society like Mozambique. Education is also put forward as a change agent, 
through emphasis on the critical aspect of education for citizenship. Critical 
consciousness is important, as people are to create, and participate in, democracy.  In 
my empirical data there is a tendency of strong emphasis on the aspect of socialization. 
This might be no surprise, considering that Mozambique has been in a state of war and 
conflicts for a long time. The need for co-existence and unity demands common values 
and common effort. There was a clear tendency in my material that the focus on co-
existence repressed the emphasis on the critical aspect. This resulted in a somewhat 
naïve view of critical consciousness, and in my opinion this shows that there is a lack 
of awareness concerning the importance of the critical aspect. 
I am concerned that this might have negative impact on the Mozambican education for 
citizenship’s ability to contribute to democratization. I believe that the critical aspect is 
important for the democratic development of Mozambique; for the Mozambican 
people’s ability to influence their own society and its just development. Hence, the 
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present situation in Mozambique makes it easier, to some extent, to understand the 
posing of conditionalities, as the critical aspect might be encouraged by the external 
partners to promote a democratic development. My material has nevertheless showed 
that there is a question to what degree the Mozambican society is ready for these 
changes at this point. I am thus not of the opinion that education for citizenship will 
solve all the problems in Mozambique, or that the critical aspect of education could be 
forced upon them. I nevertheless insist on the importance of awareness concerning this 
matter in the situation that Mozambique is in. If so, the critical aspect of education for 
citizenship could be a tool for the Mozambican people to influence not only their own 
government, but also the powerful development agents that have such a great impact 
on their country.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Reasons for my choice of theme 
When I first started working on this thesis, I wanted to do a work on development aid 
and education in an African country. I have always found democracy-theory 
interesting, and democratization is heavily emphasized on the development aid agenda. 
To me as an educationist, focus on the subject of education for citizenship was natural 
in this context, as I am of the opinion that education might play an important role in 
the process of  democratization.  
Through studies at Universidade do Algarve in Portugal I learned some Portuguese, 
and it seemed natural for me to carry out my fieldwork in an African Portuguese-
speaking country.  I found the history and present situation in Mozambique very 
interesting, and suitable for my purposes. I therefore chose to go to Maputo to do my 
fieldwork. As I have chosen to write this thesis in English, it is mainly because I feel it 
as an obligation to the people that I have talked to in Mozambique, and also because I 
am thinking that other non-Norwegians might have interest in this thesis.  
1.2 Background for my theme 
The Human Development Report from 2004 ranks Mozambique as number 171 on the 
Human Development Index (HDI1), and such placing it at the bottom of the ranking 
with the countries of low human development (United Nations Development 
Programme 2004:146). This situation has made Mozambique extremely dependent on 
development aid, and there is a vide range of external agents involved in the policy 
making in Mozambique (Plank 1993). One important focus on the area of development 
aid today is democratization and good governance -the last two decades of the 20th 
century have been called the “third wave” of democratization (United Nations 
 
1 “The human development index (HDI) focuses on three measurable dimensions of human development: living a long and healthy 
life, being educated and having a decent standard of living (…). Thus it combines measures of life expectancy, school enrolment, 
literacy and income to allow a broader view of a country’s development than does income alone.” (United Nations Development 
Programme 2004:128). 
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2002:14). Mozambique is one of the countries that recently have gone through great 
changes on their way to democracy, with its third elections in December 2004.  
Education is emphasized on the development agenda; it is an important factor for 
poverty reduction, and also for democratization (Harber 2002:267). But not any 
education will contribute to democratization (Harber 2002:268). Mozambique has 
recently introduced a new subject of education for citizenship. I find it interesting to 
study education for citizenship, which role it could play, and which role it does play in 
the Mozambican context –and that is the main focus of this thesis.  
However, there are some issues that need to be outlined and discussed before I can 
focus on the concept of education for citizenship. I need to provide a backdrop for the 
context within which this education is to be placed. This means that I need to explore 
the contemporary Mozambican context, and the historical events contributing to the 
present level of democracy in the country. I also need to investigate the development 
aid partnership between Mozambique and its donors, as this plays a decisive part in the 
development of Mozambique. I therefore get a thesis of three overlapping research 
questions, two of which are subordinate to the last one. These are as follows: 
1.3 Research questions  
I will first investigate the present democracy in Mozambique and the transition it goes 
through, and my first research question becomes: 
What characterizes the present Mozambican democracy and the transition it goes 
through? 
This research question will be addressed by examining literature on the recent history 
of Mozambique, from colonial times until the present changes into multi-party 
democracy. I have also focused on this question during my interviews, and the research 
question will therefore be investigated further through my empirical data and analysis. 
I then investigate the aid relationship between Mozambique and its donors and some 
trends in the development aid policy, to be able to explore my next research question: 
What characterizes the development aid partnership in this context?  
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Through literature studies the development aid relationship is investigated, and the 
dilemma of aid conditionality within the education sector will be emphasized. My 
respondents provide additional empirical information, contributing to the exploration 
of my second research question. 
By investigating these two sub questions, I intend to provide a basis for the 
understanding of the main concern of this thesis: The concept of education for 
citizenship in the context of democratization. I argue that education is needed in the 
present situation in Mozambique, and I find it interesting to explore further the concept 
of education for citizenship connected to this. It is of interest to explore what role it 
could play, and which role it does play, in this context. This is the focus of my final 
and main research question: 
Which role does education for citizenship play in the Mozambican context? 
This question is also first addressed through a theoretical discussion on the nature of 
education and the roles that education for citizenship could play. Through the 
empirical data my informants contribute to an understanding of how this functions in 
Mozambique. 
1.4 Conceptualizations and limitations 
Within this thesis, there are frequently used terms that need to be further 
conceptualized. This is done throughout the text as they appear, but it can be helpful to 
introduce a few of them at this point, as well. There is also a need to limit the area of 
investigation of this project, to fit within the framework of a master thesis. These 
conceptualizations contribute to the needed limitation of my thesis. 
I settle with a definition of the term democracy that emphasizes participation by all on 
an equal basis. I nevertheless criticize a static view of the term democracy and argue 
that it should be adjusted to its context. This is not an attempt to answer what kind of 
democracy Mozambique needs, or in which way it should be implemented. I rather 
intend to reveal some of the characteristics of this process of democratization, without 
forwarding any conclusive remedies.  
 
 
4
The present Mozambican democracy is to be understood as the present situation in the 
Mozambican society, with the latest changes into democracy. Furthermore, the term 
also entails the historical experiences of the Mozambican people contributing to the 
level of democratic consciousness at present. 
The development aid partnership is to be seen as the partnership between the 
Mozambican government and its international and bilateral donors, the UN agencies, 
the World Bank, and civil society. Even though I am of the opinion that I can provide a 
somewhat consistent overview of the partnership within the education sector, I 
emphasize that all partners are not included in my investigation. Hence, this study is 
not to be seen as a detailed evaluation of the development aid partnership in 
Mozambique. My investigations do not go deeply into specific development aid 
programmes, but rather provide an overview of the general atmosphere of the 
development aid partnership within the education sector. 
The theoretical outline shows that in my view the concept of Education for citizenship 
entails an aspect of creating critical consciousness as well as an aspect of socialization 
and the conveyance of common values. Within the limits of this master thesis, I am not 
able to go into the concrete content of the new subject of education for citizenship in 
Mozambican schools, but I rather discuss the concept and my informants’ 
understandings of the term in general. 
1.5 The structure of the thesis 
I start out in chapter 2 by outlining my methodological choices. I sketch the 
implications of a case study, and define my specific case. First, the preparations for my 
fieldwork are addressed -organizing an interview guide and contacting informants that 
were interesting to me. I then go on to discuss the qualitative interview. This setting is 
a special interaction between respondent and researcher, and has ethical and 
methodical implications. I also discuss the process of analysis and the categorization of 
themes in my empirical data.   Throughout the whole chapter I have my own fieldwork 
in mind and I finally evaluate its validity and reliability. The ethical implications of 
doing research, in particular within a cross-cultural context, are heavily emphasized. 
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In chapter 3 the Mozambican historical background is outlined, to clarify the setting of 
my thesis, and to provide a backdrop to the present situation in the country. With this 
historical sketch, I intend to provide a picture of Mozambique as a country with, 
historically and present, numerous challenges; a country with a lack of democratic 
experience in need of democratization and education for citizenship. This is an 
important pre-understanding for the further investigation of the role that education for 
citizenship can play in Mozambique at present.  
The development aid agents also play a vital role in the development of Mozambique. 
It is of utmost concern in which way the external partners, who advocate the 
democratic principles, appear in the political cooperation with Mozambique. In 
chapter 4 I therefore discuss the aid relationship, and its role on the democracy arena. 
Connected to this is the dilemma of conditionality. The Sector Wide Approach 
(SWAp) and this approach’s intentions to create a partnership between the different 
stakeholders, and to promote increased local ownership, are longed-for in this context. 
I discuss that the SWAp is criticized for not fulfilling its intentions, but rather 
continuing or maybe even deteriorating the situation of aid linked to conditionality. I 
explore what impact this has on the democratization process in Mozambique, and ask 
whether the aid relationship is an obstacle to the democratization of Mozambique, or 
whether it can contribute to a democratic development. I argue that the Mozambican 
people need to be able to influence and control the impact that the powerful 
development aid agents have on the development of their country, and here education 
for citizenship has a role to play. 
The discussions to follow, concerning democratization and education for citizenship, 
demand further focus on the concept of democracy. In chapter 5 the origin and 
transformation of the term is addressed, and I ask whether it is necessarily the Western, 
liberal understanding of the term, that is the only one valid. I also question whether this 
understanding, which is encouraged by the donor partners, is transferable to the 
African context. I proceed to explain some of the reasons why a pure transfer of 
democracy to Africa is difficult, due to the cultural differences between the West and 
the “traditional African societies”. Also the present African context with huge 
problems of poverty stands as an obstacle for the process of democratization in the 
country. A definition of the term is provided, opening for a contextual understanding 
of democracy. This definition also emphasizes participation, and participation demands 
 
 
6
an informed public. Herein lays an important responsibility for education for 
citizenship. 
In chapter 6 I finally outline the concept of education for citizenship, and the role that 
education has in a process of democratization is discussed. This provides a theoretical 
staring-point for the discussions concerning what role education for citizenship can 
play in Mozambique. I emphasize that education can function either as an agent of 
reproduction or and agent for development and change, and that it therefore is of vital 
importance what kind of education is promoted. I argue that in a democratic society the 
objectives and values will be those of continued change and improvement. 
Consequently, education will socialize its citizens into a culture that encompasses the 
critical aspect. I then go on to outline these aspects connected to education for 
citizenship. Theoretically, the concept of education for citizenship might be said to 
play at least two important roles: It should contribute to the creation of a critical 
consciousness, as I view this as a precondition for the development of a viable 
democracy. Education for citizenship also plays a role when it comes to the 
conveyance of common values. The dilemma of the conveyance of values is addressed; 
both because a pure transfer of values might not be possible, and because the finding 
of a common basis of values is a difficult matter. Nevertheless, common values are 
vital for the state-building project, and supposedly even more so in developing 
countries. Hence, the need for unity and co-effort might lead to another balancing of 
the two aspects of education in Mozambique than in more developed countries with an 
older democratic tradition.  
This will be addressed in chapter7, as my empiric findings are outlined. I analyze them 
in the light of the theory presented in the preceding chapters. The structure of chapter 7 
is centred on my three research questions, and I complete the exploration of these.  
In the final chapter I sum up the investigation of my research questions, and provide 
some concluding remarks. 
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2. QUALITATIVE METHODOLOGY 
While doing scientific investigations, the methodologies used will necessarily be 
decided by the area of investigation, and the questions asked. I have studied the 
democratization of Mozambique and the relationship between the partners in the 
education sector. A quantitative approach would not have provided me with the 
answers I needed, as I wanted to go deeper into one specific case. A qualitative case 
study with open-ended qualitative interviews was the suitable tool. In this chapter my 
methodological choices are outlined, and I discuss methodological and ethical 
implications of my research project. My specific case is introduced as I focus on the 
preparation of an interview-guide, the choice of my sample and the completion of my 
fieldwork (2.1). I sketch the implication of the qualitative interview and my 
experiences in interaction with the respondents, and also how I conducted the analysis 
of my empirical data (2.2). The validity and reliability of my research are addressed, 
with examples of how I have critically evaluated this (2.3). Finally, ethical 
implications are discussed, especially in the context of a cross-cultural research project 
(2.4). A final evaluation of the methodological implications is outlined in the summary 
(2.5). 
2.1 The case study 
Robert K. Yin defines the case study as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries 
between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (Yin 1994:13). A case study 
will therefore not investigate a matter detached from its context, but rather take its 
context into account, and emphasize its relevance for the phenomenon studied.  There 
are many ways to study a phenomenon and its context, and Yin (1994:80) claims that 
the case study makes use of different sources of evidence, and hence, different 
methodologies. Thus, my case study consists of three different sources: documentation, 
archival records and interviews. I regarded these sources as the most convenient and 
worthwhile for my purposes. The document sources I have used are policy 
declarations, written reports of meetings, administrative documents and other internal 
documents, formal studies or evaluations of the same “site” under study, and 
newspaper clippings. I have also used some archival records, providing me with 
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numbers and facts about Mozambique. I got some of the documentation from my 
informants, others from my tutor or on internet and in libraries. Nevertheless, my 
interviews are the source most emphasized, and the source providing me with most 
information. 
2.1.1 Preparations for my fieldwork; the interview guide 
When preparing my fieldwork, I started out by reading documents on the Mozambican 
educational policy and literature on Mozambique in general; its political and historical 
background. I also read literature about education and development, aid relationship 
and democratic development. I prepared an interview guide (appendix 1) with my 
questions divided into three main areas, with specific questions directed to the different 
stakeholders. The first questions concerned the aid relationship and focused on the 
SWAp and the cooperation between the different partners. The next questions focused 
more concretely on the content of the new Education Sector Strategic Plan (ESSP) and 
the new curriculum for education for citizenship. In turn, these questions led to a 
discussion about democracy and its state in the present Mozambican society.  
2.1.2 Choosing my sample 
One of the main issues when conducting research is how to choose the sample. Since 
my thesis focused on a subject involving a quite limited number of persons, some of 
the people I needed to talk to were given; the sample was strategically chosen and 
limited to the persons that would provide me with relevant information. Tove Thagaard 
calls this a “convenience sample” (Thagaard 2002:54, my translation). Frequently, the 
“snowball technique” (Ryen 2002:90, my translation) made my sample expand; my 
informants recommended other persons to talk to. As I chose my sample, I was 
concerned to get a variety of stakeholders represented, both from the donor side, the 
government side and from civil society. This was important to me, to secure internal 
validity. The representatives for civil society are from different Mozambican non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) working with education or democratization, 
situated in Maputo. I prepared a list of key persons and institutions before I left home, 
and contacted some of them by e-mail or phone before I left. I preferably wanted to 
talk to more than one person from each office, to strengthen reliability and internal 
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validity, but often there was only one person at each office able to answer the 
questions of my concern. I ended up talking to 15 persons; eight of them becoming my 
most important sources, providing me important information, and the remaining seven 
functioning as supporting sources. 
2.1.3 Completion of my fieldwork  
I undertook my fieldwork in Maputo during a nine weeks period in the spring of 2004. 
This was my first time in Africa, and my first time in the role of a researcher. I knew I 
had a lot to learn, not only from the information I would collect, but also culturally and 
professionally, as a qualitative researcher. During my whole stay in Mozambique I 
spent much time making appointments. Eventually I discovered that it was better to go 
to the offices in person, and then get an appointment to get an appointment. 
Nevertheless, my appointments were often postponed, either to another day, or later 
that same day.  
As I started doing my first interviews, it soon turned out that some of the respondents I 
had contacted from home were not really that interesting to my thesis. I therefore 
undertook some interviews that did not provide me with accurate information 
concerning the main aspects of my thesis, but which gave me general information that 
helped me validate the information that I got later from more central stakeholders in 
the process. These first interviews also gave me valuable methodological practice and 
experience. They made me more secure in the role as a researcher, and gave me time to 
become familiar with my interview guide so that I got more independent of it. This 
resulted in making the later interviews more casual and comfortable.  
2.2 The qualitative interview 
The best way to find out about a phenomenon in the social world is by talking to the 
people involved. The interview can be seen as a dialogue between partners, but where 
the interviewer has the control, structuring the conversation and deciding the topics to 
be discussed. Knowledge is constructed in the interaction between respondent and 
interviewer (Kvale 1996). Steinar Kvale defines the semi structured life world 
interview as “an interview whose purpose is to obtain descriptions of the life world of 
the interviewee with respect to interpreting the meaning of the described phenomena” 
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(Kvale 1996:5-6). This process is not unproblematic, and as we will see in the 
following, both methodological and ethical issues must be taken into account.  
Interviews can be structured to a greater or lesser degree, from standardized schedules 
to open interviews based on themes. Normally half-structured, open-ended qualitative 
interviews are structured according to an interview guide, but are flexible enough to 
allow unexpected turns in the conversation. This makes the interview situation quite 
spontaneous and demanding for the researcher. Choices have to be taken along the 
way, and this is of course easier with experience (Kvale 1996). My interview guide 
was meant as a check-list, to make sure that the respondents touched upon some of the 
same areas, but not to be followed in a strict manner.  
Many of my respondents were people in high ranks in the Mozambican society. They 
had busy agendas, and even though they were all very welcoming and friendly to me, I 
sometimes felt uncomfortable by taking one hour of their valuable time. This forced 
some stress on me, often making it difficult to ask all the questions I wanted to ask. At 
times it prevented me from repeating their answers and asking them follow-up 
questions to secure validity. With some of my respondents I also had the problem that 
they would not talk about things that was not part of their working area. If I wanted 
them to reflect on education or democracy in general, some were reluctant to do so. To 
me it seemed that they were afraid to talk about things that were not part of their 
professional education, maybe being afraid that they would show their possible 
ignorance. I tried to make the situation as safe as possible, assuring them that I just 
wanted their reflections and had no correct answers. This was somehow difficult, as I 
was very much in the role of a guest and my informants the hosts.  
2.2.1 Analysis of data 
I transcribed my interviews during my stay in Mozambique and immediately after my 
return to Norway. Five of my interviews were conducted in Portuguese. I translated 
these into English, and these citations are therefore marked “my translation”. I felt it 
was important to do the transcribations a soon as possible, while the conversations 
were still fresh in my memory. By the time I finished, I felt I had a good overview of 
the tendencies in my material, and I decided to put the transcriptions away for a while, 
to get distance from the material.  
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After some months I started to do the in-depth analysis of the transcriptions. The 
analysis had, of course, started earlier, as this is a process going on throughout the 
whole progression of research. Anne Ryen (2002) claims that it is neither possible, nor 
desirable, to separate the different stages in the research process. Data managing, 
categorization and interpretation overlap throughout the whole process. Ryen 
(2002:147ff) makes account for a procedure of in-depth analysis of raw data. This 
procedure evolves from the raw data, and throughout the analysis, the amount of data 
should be reduced. From the transcribed citations, the researcher isolates units of 
meaning, which (s)he can reduce further to certain categories. All isolated units of 
meaning are systematized in this way and put into the categories that they belong to. 
This leads to a continuing process of development and revision of categories. If a unit 
does not fit into any of the existing categories, a new one has to be created, or an old 
one must be altered. Eventually one ends up with all raw data systematized into groups 
of categories and sub-categories, which can be related to, and create, theory. I ended 
up with a schema with all information put into categories evolving from the interviews. 
In that way I reduced the amount of data, and it became easier to compare the 
statements from the different stakeholders and hold it up against relevant theory. A 
danger with this procedure could be that the categories are part of the researcher’s pre-
understandings, and that these influence the way one interpret the raw data. The 
categories should not be created in advance, but rather appear from the material from 
the field, Ryen claims. Nevertheless, already as one chooses one’s theoretical material 
and the focus of questions in the interview guide, I am of the opinion that one does 
necessarily have some categories in the back of one’s head, and I cannot be sure that 
the categories found were not influenced by my pre-understandings. According to 
Hanson’s thesis, however, this is part and parcel of all research. Our observations will 
be influenced by our background knowledge (Phillips 2000:104). Ryen (2002) also 
reminds us that it is important to keep in mind that the results of the analysis are a 
construction of the social reality. Another researcher might have found other 
categories, and hence, the construction that we reach, is only one of many possible. 
2.3 Validity of research results 
Research entails various types of conclusions and interpretations. Lund (2002) claims 
that we make causal conclusions, generalizations and conclusions connected to the 
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relationship between constructs and their indicators. All these conclusions combined 
answer the research questions and the hypotheses of a project. To make sure that the 
phenomenon of interest is portrayed in a proper way, it is important that these 
conclusions, or inferences, are of high quality. They should be said to have a 
reasonable high degree of security, or validity (Lund 2002:85). When I am about to 
evaluate the validity of my research, I focus on its external validity, internal validity 
and its construct validity, which also takes reliability into account.  
2.3.1 External validity 
External validity, or generalization, is an important feature of research and science. 
Through research on a specific area, the hope is that we can apply our knowledge to 
other areas or other persons. Some of the criticism against the case study and 
qualitative methods in general, has been that its results can not be generalized. Yin 
(1994:10) argues that one has to distinguish between statistical generalizations and 
analytic generalizations. The latter type of generalizations, the analytic, is the one used 
on case studies. The empirical results of a case study can be compared with a 
previously developed theory, and if more cases support the same theory, replication 
can be claimed.  Kvale (1996:233) claims that an analytic generalization is a reasoned 
evaluation of the degree to which the findings from one study can be used as a 
guidance to predict what will probably happen in another situation. For me, it has been 
important to describe the Mozambican situation as exactly as possible, to ensure that 
my case’s context is explicit. In this way, I have intended to make sure that my 
research results can be critically evaluated and compared with theory, and with 
research done on the same subject, or on similar cases. Such, I have attempted to 
secure external validity, and I hope that the results of my study can be transferred to 
other comparable situations, for developing countries at a similar stage. 
2.3.2 Internal validity 
Internal validity is often associated with causality. But internal validity can also be 
connected to the broader problem of validity of inferences (Lund 2002). Throughout a 
case study, conclusions will be drawn each time a phenomenon cannot be directly 
observed. It is therefore important that these inferences are always questioned critically 
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(Yin 1994). Throughout my thesis I make assumptions and conclusions, and these can 
be said to be more or less valid. When securing internal validity, it is important that the 
researcher keeps in mind that there are a variety of different interpretations, and hence 
conclusions, available. The task is to choose the one most probable (Yin 1994). Ryen 
(2002) argues that internal validity is secured by trying to discard all threats to one’s 
causalities or conclusions. For instance; through literature research I find that there is a 
tendency of lack of democratic experience in societies similar to Mozambique. 
Literature also shows that the Mozambican history entails features that might serve as 
obstacles to democratization. My informants talk about the misunderstandings of the 
term democracy and the need for information, and I also get information about the 
Mozambican society as not consolidated in democracy, but rather consistent of 
undemocratic practices. It is a probable interpretation that there exists a lack of 
democratic experience in the Mozambican society, on all levels, and this is part of my 
conclusions in chapter 7. There might be other explanations as well, and these can be 
seen as threats to my interpretation. One might think that the Mozambicans are not 
interested in politics or democracy; one might conclude that democracy is not possible 
or desirable in Mozambique, or even that there is conscious disinformation going on. I 
have nevertheless attempted to keep an open mind to other interpretations and 
conclusions than my own, and I have also tried to make sure that there are no unknown 
factors interfering, when drawing the conclusions that I find the most probable. 
2.3.3 Construct validity 
Through research we attempt to describe reality, and since we in the social sciences 
often use visible indicators to measure abstract terms, the question of construct validity 
is extremely important. While explaining the concept of construct validity, Kleven 
argues that we have no other choice than to construct a bridge between the empiric 
level, and our theoretic, abstract level of terms and theories, by using 
conceptualizations (Kleven 2002: 141, my translation). The main issue is to what 
extent there is coherence between the theoretical definition of the term, and the way it 
has been conceptualized. Sine this thesis is very much about the different 
understandings of terms like democracy and education for citizenship, it has been 
difficult to conceptualize these terms in advance. One objective of this thesis has been 
to investigate the different conceptualizations that exist. On this point I have 
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nevertheless been clear, and as I for instance have talked to my respondents about 
democracy, I have emphasized that I view this term as context-bound, and that I am 
interested in their understanding of the term. This has been a premise for discussions, 
and as such I have secured construct validity.  
2.3.4 Reliability 
Construct validity is also connected to reliability. Thor Arnfinn Kleven (2002:154) 
describes reliability as the degree of haphazard errors of measurement; how exact the 
measurements are, and if they measure what they are said to measure. One way to 
secure reliability of the data is to be aware of the aspect of equivalence (Kleven 
2002:159, my translation). This concerns to what degree the measurements are 
influenced by the concrete questions asked, or if other equivalent questions would 
result in the same answers. I always tried to ask follow-up questions when things were 
unclear, and, when time allowed me, I tried to express how I understood my 
informants’ answers in order to get misunderstandings out of the way. An important 
factor for the reliability of my interviews is my choice of using a recorder under the 
sessions. This made it possible to get more accurate information from my respondents, 
and also, I was able to get an accurate transcription of their answers. This was also an 
advantage in the process of analysis, as I could get other people to read the 
transcriptions when I had doubts about the interpretations.  
This concerns another aspect of reliability; the aspect of the observer (Kleven 
2002:168, translated by me), and to what degree what is understood depends on her/his 
interpretations. The use of a recorder also minimized the language problems, as I was 
able to listen through my interviews at a later point, to get a more detailed 
understanding of them. It freed time to pay more attention to the respondents during 
the interviews, putting my follow-up questions and making the conversation as smooth 
as possible. But the use of a recorder might also have had negative impacts.  Some of 
my respondents might have felt uncomfortable in a setting with the recorder present, 
and they might have been reluctant to speak honestly about certain matters.  
There is also a reason to believe that I as a person might have influenced my 
informants and their answers. This concerns the aspect of stability (Kleven 2002:159, 
my translation); to what extent the informants’ answers are congruent over time. For 
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instance, many of my informants mentioned agents from the North on the development 
aid agenda, which might have been influenced by the fact that I come from the North. 
It is probable that reliability has been threatened in this particular case, and one must 
be aware of this danger.  
2.4 Ethical implications 
2.4.1 Responsibility for my case and informants 
When conducting research, there are many ethical considerations to keep in mind. In 
the “Ethical directions for research on social sciences, law and human sciences”2 one 
of the ethical norms concerns the search for truth and accountability (Den nasjonale 
forskningsetiske komité for samfunnsvitenskap og humaniora 20033). In addition to 
conducting critical revision of one’s findings, one also needs to be conscious about the 
danger of biased research. It is obvious that this has ethical implications. Consideration 
to the phenomenon of interests and the persons involved, demands a reasonable and 
fair presentation of the research findings.  
Throughout the research process, I always tried to act professionally and reliable. In 
the meeting with my respondents it was important for me to assure them that I am 
aware of the seriousness of my work, and that I am strongly concerned about its ethical 
implications. The ethical directions emphasize the importance of getting the 
informants’ agreement to participate (Den nasjonale forskningsetiske komité for 
samfunnsvitenskap og humaniora 20034). I therefore always started my interviews by 
telling my respondents what their information would be used for and what I wanted to 
talk about. I emphasized that the participation was voluntary, and that they could end 
the interview whenever they wanted to.  After this information, I understood my 
informants’ willingness to meet me as their “informed agreement” to participate (Ryen 
2002:208).  I told them I had a recorder, but they were free to choose whether I could 
 
2 My translation, from Norwegian: “Forskningstiske retningslinjer for samfunnsvitenskap, jus og humaniora”. 
3 Document from the web, page number 6 on print-out. 
4 Document from the web, page number 8 on print-out. 
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use it or not. I also emphasized that they could ask me to stop recording at any time 
during the interview, and that they could also ask me questions in connection to my 
project.  
Another important ethical implication, also mentioned by the ethical directions, is the 
issue of anonymity. The respondents should be secured that what they say will be kept 
confidential, and that its use will not do them any harm (Den nasjonale 
forskningsetiske komité for samfunnsvitenskap og humaniora 20035). I strongly 
emphasized that my respondents’ names, as well as their institutions or organizations, 
would be kept anonymous as far as possible. The informants from civil society, some 
from the donor community and also some from different governmental institutions are 
in that way kept anonymous to a great extent. I have tried to keep my informants 
anonymous also by keeping them neutral of gender, since the environment that I have 
selected them from is quite small and transparent. Informants from the bigger 
institutions and organizations, such as Unesco, the World Bank and the ministry, 
nevertheless agreed to let me make their institutions explicit, and I find this of interest 
for the analysis. I am of the opinion that this has had no influence on the results of my 
analysis. The educationist Birgit Brock-Utne (1996) discusses the problem of 
anonymity in connection to the need for external validity. Because as one aspires for 
external validity, and keeps the contextual surroundings explicit, anonymity will be 
harder to maintain. It is always a task for the researcher to balance these two 
considerations. Since many times there were only one or two persons available at each 
institution, working on my area of interest, I cannot be sure that no one can be 
recognized in my thesis. The focus on anonymity has, however, been a heavy priority 
in this project. 
I also, as the ethical directions prescribe (Den nasjonale forskningsetiske komité for 
samfunnsvitenskap og humaniora 20036), emphasize that my work should bring 
something back to Mozambique. I therefore decided to write this thesis in English, to 
make it available for my respondents and others in Mozambique. I intend to do my 
best to make sure that all my respondents will have the possibility to read the final 
 
5 Document from the web, page number 11 on print-out. 
6 Document from the web, page number 9 on print-out. 
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thesis, if they wish so. Not only because they then will be able to criticize my work, 
since they have been involved in it, but it is also my hope that this thesis can be of 
practical use.  
2.4.2 Cross-cultural research 
Connected to the ethical implications of qualitative methodology, the investigator’s 
role in the field is always important to have in mind. In my research project, conducted 
in another country with a different culture, this becomes especially important. We are 
doing research on the social world, and the researcher will necessarily be an insider or 
an outsider in the environment of interest. Brock-Utne (1996:607) emphasizes that it is 
important that research on Africa is also done by Africans, and not only by expatriates. 
The insider has a special position that will give her/him knowledge that the outsider 
will not get, and (s)he also has knowledge that makes her/him able to put the right 
questions. On the other hand, there is a question of the ability to stay objective enough, 
when one is strongly connected to the field. An outsider perspective might throw light 
on other sides of a matter, not obvious to the insider (Brock-Utne 1996:610).  
During my fieldwork I had only limited contact with my respondents, as the interviews 
normally lasted about one hour. I was certainly an outsider in the field of my area of 
investigation, although I tried to be conscious about the African perspective on the 
matter. In this regard, I have tried to make extensive use of literature and theory with 
an insider-perspective, written by Africans. Nevertheless, I am a white, young woman 
and my informants are mostly black men, often middle-aged. I needed to be concerned 
that some of them might feel uncomfortable with the situation. The history of 
colonization and aid dependency could have played a role in this situation, as 
Mozambicans are used to relate to white, foreign “experts”, which might have given 
them a more or less sceptical attitude to new, white academics arriving. I did not feel 
this as a problem, though, as most of the people I talked to, clearly had a higher status 
than me. In that way some of the cultural barriers were neutralized by the fact that my 
respondents and I often shared a common academic background. The gender issue 
could become more problematic. Brock-Utne (1993:65) describes her experiences of 
being a white woman in a black academic environment, dominated by men. She claims 
that there is a contrast between the behaviour demanded in an academic environment 
and the behaviour expected of women in many African cultures. These women have to 
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perform more carefully than their sisters in the North. Hence, some of my respondents 
may have felt uncomfortable in relating professionally to a woman. Also the fact that I 
am quite young could be a disadvantage, as elderly people are more respected in Africa 
(Sono 1993:41). I tried to minimize these cultural barriers by behaving respectfully, 
dressing formally and by always being polite and patient.  
2.5 Summary and concluding evaluation of validity 
Upon finalizing this thesis, I have of course got experiences and knowledge of things I 
would have done differently if I had had more time or other resources for this project. 
It would for instance be interesting to undertake new interviews to be able to go more 
at depth with the final focus of my thesis, or to validate the interviews already 
conducted. I am however of the opinion that I have been as explicit and structured as 
possible throughout the whole work with this thesis, and that this contributes to a valid 
research result. The interview guide and my early contact with some respondents was a 
good preparation for my fieldwork. I have been aware of the difficulties of the 
interview situation, especially in a cross-cultural study like mine, and I have taken 
ethical considerations into account. Throughout the process of translation, transcription 
and analysis of data, I have been conscious in my decisions. 
Overall, I have attempted to secure external validity as I have been careful to outline 
the context of my thesis, so that analytical generalizations might be made. Internal 
validity has carefully been considered through my own critical attitude to conclusions 
drawn, and so has construct validity. Reliability is secured by investigation of the 
aspect of equivalence, the aspect of the observer, and the use of a recorder has helped 
me in doing this. I am of the opinion that the validity of this research project is secured 
within the limits of what one might demand of a master thesis. I have attempted to 
structure this thesis to make it available for critical evaluation of research methods and 
conclusions. 
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3. THE MOZAMBICAN BACKGROUND  
The Mozambican history is one of oppression and exploitation of the Mozambicans, 
making it a country with generations lacking democratic experience, at least in a 
Western sense. First, the colonial masters made the Mozambicans inferior and left 
them with no democratic experience as they were becoming independent (3.1). Then 
the liberation heroes from Frente de Libertação de Mozambique (Frelimo) continued 
this development, as they gained power and introduced a socialist, one-party regime 
that gradually detached from the Mozambican people (3.2 and 3.3). External forces 
have also contributed to this lack of democratic experience. They took part in a civil 
war which lasted for about 15 years (3.4), making Mozambique even more dependent 
on external aid (3.5). The latest events with multi-party elections and other changes 
into a Western-type democracy have had positive outcomes for the Mozambican 
democracy, but there are also drawbacks, making it clear that it is still a way to go 
before the democracy in Mozambique can be said to be consolidated (3.6). Through 
this outline, the lack of democratic experience becomes apparent, and in the summary I 
argue that this illustrates the need for education for citizenship (3.7). 
3.1 Portuguese Colony 
When the Portuguese arrived in Mozambique in 1498, this had at first little influence 
on the Bantu people living in the area (Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1995:15). The spice 
trade from the Far East was lucrative, and in searching for a sea route around Africa, 
Mozambique became a station on the way (Newitt 1995). But with the industrial 
revolution in the middle of the eighteenth century came the need for slaves, making it 
the dominant commodity (Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1995:15; Newitt 1995:245). The 
historian Malyn Newitt (1995:383) claims that it soon appeared that the most 
exploitable resource of the colony was the African population. A law of 1899 divided 
the Mozambicans into two classes; the indígenas (natives) and the não-indígenas.  The 
não-indígenas had full Portuguese citizenship rights, while the indígenas were to 
follow the laws of the colony. This had the greatest impact when it came to labour and 
taxes. Chiefs or régulos were appointed by the colony masters to administer the 
indígenas and collect their taxes and recruit labour. Forced labour and taxes became an 
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important income for the Portuguese mother-country, and part of the regime that the 
indígenas had to get accustomed to (Newitt 1995). 
Mozambique was influenced by the developments in the colony’s mother country, and 
in 1926 there was a military coup in Portugal. The generals gaining power became 
increasingly dependent on Professor António Salazar, who became the finance minister 
and later the prime minister with total control of the government. Salazar ruled 
Portugal according to contemporary fascism, and the enemies of the regime, European 
and African, emphasized that during the period with Salazar in power, all freedom was 
suppressed, and the African people was reduced to forced labour (Newitt 1995).  
The Portuguese revolution in 1974 put an end to the Salazar regime, and even though 
this period can be characterized as a “nightmare” for the Mozambicans (Newitt 
1995:446), it had some positive consequences for the country.  At independence in 
1975, Mozambique was better off than many other African states. It had good export 
possibilities and it had developed industries of different kinds (Newitt 1995). It is 
nevertheless no doubt that the colonial era had negative effects, and Newitt (1995:389-
390) claims that one of these, is the lack of political and administrative experience. 
The colonial regime also had an impact when it came to education. The educationist 
Derek Heater (2004) claims that education for citizenship was ignored, partly because 
it was not to the advantage of the colonists, as their superiority was built on the 
ignorance of the natives. Overall, the development of citizenship is incompatible with 
colonialism (Heater 2004:125). The colonialist philosophy of superiority stands in 
huge contrast to the equal participation of citizens, needed in a democracy. But the 
colonists did eventually experience a dilemma concerning education. They needed 
educated natives as clerks, but at the same time they feared that this education would 
develop in them a desire for independence. The education provided was to create a 
native elite of replicas of the citizens of the colonies’ mother-countries. In 
Mozambique these were to become assimilados (Heater 2004:128), assimilated into 
the Portuguese culture. Little was done to promote education for the masses in 
Mozambique, as this was seen as a threat to Portuguese interests. Not until 
independence, education and education for citizenship was acknowledged by the 
indigenous leaders, as a vital tool for the building of their new-born nations (Heater 
2004:144).   
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3.1.1 Lack of democratic experience 
Newitt argues that even though in the 1920s the colonies were to achieve more 
autonomy, this did not happen in practice. Mozambique was still ruled by a colonial 
administrative elite, and local opinion was not heard. This had consequences for 
Mozambique later on: 
The failure to develop any organs of settler or indigenous democracy was to 
have great significance. It meant that the settlers were never able to stage an 
independent take-over of Mozambique like the white Rhodesian seizure of 
power in 1965. It also meant that the Afro-Portuguese, who had been so 
influential in the earlier phases of Mozambique’s history, were altogether 
excluded from power and no local groupings with political or administrative 
experience would emerge among any sector of the Mozambique population. 
This lack of political or even administrative experience was to have serious 
consequences when Mozambique eventually became independent. (Newitt 
1995:389-390). 
Freire describes the same situation in Brazil. I find his thoughts interesting also applied 
on the Mozambican context, as there are great similarities between the two countries. 
Freire labels a society without democratic experience a closed society, and argues that 
democratic inexperience is the major obstacle to democratization (Freire 1974:21). 
3.2 Liberation struggle and socialism 
Portugal experienced little challenge to its African colonial empire before the 1960s. 
The Portuguese opposition was weak and divided, and not much interested in the 
colonial issue (Newitt 1995: 517). The state security police kept people that were 
hostile to the regime at a close watch. Mozambican nationalism was thus born abroad. 
Expatriates in the neighbouring countries joined in different organizations, responding 
to the first wave of decolonisation. Three of these organizations came together and 
founded Frelimo in June 1962 (Newitt 1995).  
The independence struggle had been fought by peaceful means, but in 1964 an armed 
liberation struggle began (Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1995). The revolution in Portugal 
in 1974 created confusion in Mozambique, as to who was in charge, and hence, 
Frelimo could continue its warfare, meeting no resistance (Newitt 1995). Since other 
fractions in Mozambique, not supporting Frelimo, were not strong enough to organize 
themselves politically, there was no alternative to Frelimo rule as the new government 
took office in Portugal (Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1995:27). On 7 September 1974, the 
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Lusaka Accord was signed, transferring power to the liberation heroes of Frelimo, 
without prior elections (Newitt 1995). But the economy the first five years after 
independence was at a downturn. The settlers left the country and brought all their 
materials, money and resources in addition to their own skills. At the same time, 
Mozambican miners were left out from the industry in South Africa, contributing to 
less cash flow from their earnings. Additionally, floods and droughts in this period 
brought much of the population close to starvation (Newitt 1995:551). The one-party 
regime of Frelimo had heavy challenges ahead. 
3.3 One-party regime 
Newitt (1995:541) claims that Frelimo was an intellectuals’ party from the beginning.  
It was emphasized that the country’s history, social structure and economic 
development needed to be studied, to ensure the best possible policies. Frelimo 
performed a class struggle, and mass mobilization of the peasantry was important 
(Newitt 1995). But Newitt (1995:543) argues that there was a change in the nature of 
the party after independence. Mass mobilization was still important, but now rather 
through organizations outside the party structure (Newitt 1995). The journalist and 
writer Joseph Hanlon claims that Frelimo became a “vanguard” party; power was 
gathered within the party and the state apparatus (Hanlon 1991:13). There was a 
change in politics, possibly caused by the difficulties the new leaders had to handle: 
Whereas previously the party had often been prepared for lengthy popular 
debates on important issues before decisions were reached, after 1975 these 
popular democratic procedures tended to be circumvented. Party members 
gradually changed their role from dynamising, motivating and creating 
political consciousness in a newly liberated people, to issuing orders and 
carrying centrally decided party diktats to the provinces (Newitt1995:543).  
At the same time, the escape of the Portuguese settlers and the break-down of the 
Mozambican administration meant these posts had to be filled by party members. 
Increasingly, a division between the party and the people arose. The intellectual origin 
of the party became evident, as its politics was rather based in theory, and not in 
people’s reality. This was, however, a dilemma of great concern to the leadership, who 
were aware of the problems with a one-party democracy that is not in contact with its 
people. To prevent this, they arranged elections for a pyramid of popular assemblies on 
national, provincial, district, city and local levels (Newitt 1995). They also exerted 
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“self-criticism”, by publicly admitting mistakes. This can be said to have been a clever 
political tool, as Frelimo in that way was able to draw attention away from other cases 
that would have been more of a challenge to them (Newitt 1995:544). There was a 
gradual shift to the left in Frelimo’s policy, and this development culminated on the 
third party congress in 1977, where it declared itself as a Marxist-Leninist Party 
(Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1995; Newitt 1995).   
There can be many reasons to why authoritarian regimes are implemented. Diamond 
(1993) claims that the nature of the African fight for liberation and de-colonization was 
influenced by the lack of democratic experience. The main objective was to get rid of 
the colonial power and everything that belonged to it. The existing structures and 
systems were not to be inherited, but rather rejected as alien: “Democratic norms were 
thus expressed primarily in terms of protest, opposition, and “counter-hegemony”, 
rather than in terms of tolerance, liberty and democratic procedures” (Diamond 
1993:17). Another problem was that the period of transition from colonial regimes to 
independence and democratic elections was very short. People’s minds and public 
institutions were not prepared for the transition, and not able to carry it out in a 
satisfactory manner:  
Democratic institutions in the newly-dependent states faced serious obstacles: 
ethnic divisions and a shallow sense of nationhood, fragile political 
institutions and political leadership only weakly committed to democracy, 
limited managerial and technical talent, high popular expectations in severely 
restricted economic circumstances and a tendency, in the absence of a 
vigorous private sector, for political leaders to see the state as the prime 
source of personal enrichment (Harber 1997:14-15).  
To be able to control the situation, authoritarian regimes were frequently implemented. 
There was a belief that a single party could represent everybody without support along 
ethnic divides, as a multi-party system would encourage. Its justification was based in 
the tradition of a single, uncontested chief (Harber 1997:15).  
The former president of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere, speaks in favour of the one-party 
democracy and its election system (Nyerere 1973). He argues that this electoral system 
“must allow the people to elect a competent government which reflects their feelings 
and ideas; and it must enable them to do this without damaging the society in which 
they live, or the long-term objectives they have set themselves” (Nyerere 1973:186). 
The democracy is taken care of by the fact that the people can choose between 
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different candidates, and he argues that the elections make the Party stay in touch with 
the people. But as I have argued, this did not last for long in Mozambique. At the same 
time, Nyerere emphasizes that the one-party elections make sure that the people do not 
damage the objectives they have set themselves, reflecting the communal, African 
tradition. But this might also be interpreted as undemocratic at its greatest sense. To 
me, it seems like if the range of choices for the people will be reduced, and one might 
ask oneself; who did actually set these long-term objectives? It appears that the 
organization of the Mozambican society by a one-party regime could not longer make 
use of its democratic potential, and this might have contributed to a continuation of the 
lack of democratic experience. 
3.4 Destabilization and “civil war” 
Alongside all the challenges for the new regime were also the regional conflicts in the 
area. South Africa had for a long time led a policy for co-existence in the region, 
which served as a security for Mozambique. But after the independence of the earlier 
white regimes in Southern Africa, a change in South African policy took place. The 
earlier focus on co-existence was followed by a set determination for survival of South 
Africa (Newitt 1995:559-560). In South Africa the apartheid regime ruled, led by a 
white minority. A black majority rule was seen as dangerous, resulting in a communist 
state. For this reason, it was important for the South African rulers to prevent the black 
Marxist-Leninist Mozambique and Angola from spreading their ideology and 
contribute to riots in South Africa. The South African apartheid regime was criticized 
internationally for its racist rule, but marked by the environment of the Cold War the 
American President Reagan was of the opinion that preventing the spreading of 
socialist economy and policy, was of major importance (Abrahamsson and Nilsson 
1995).  Hence, the foreign policy of South Africa has been described as a policy of 
destabilization. Attacks on countries in the region were said to be strikes at African 
National Congress (ANC) – bases, but were rather attacks to demonstrate South 
Africa’s strength (Newitt 1995:561-562).  
Also part of this policy of destabilization was the support of, and in the case of 
Mozambique creation of, rebel movements in the neighbouring countries (Newitt 
1995). Resestência Nacional Moçambicana (Renamo) was created abroad by 
dissidents from Frelimo, not as a political movement, but rather as a military unit, with 
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the rural population as its principal targets (Newitt 1995:564). By 1984 Renamo had 
offices in Lisbon, West Germany and in the United States. That year its political 
statements were pledged at a congress, and Renamo turned into a political movement. 
This was important for Reagan and South Africa, who wanted Renamo to be 
internationally accepted (Newitt 1995:565). Abrahamsson and Nilsson (1995:58) 
points to the regional and international aspect of the war. It was a regional conflict 
between apartheid-friendly states and their opposites, and also an international conflict 
between communism and capitalism. One might question whether the term “civil war” 
is suitable in this context. 
Up to 1986, Renamo was pretty much controlled by foreign masters, but now this 
control was lost, and Renamo developed on its own, within Mozambique. Even though 
a security agreement was signed at Nkomati in 1984, the fighting and terror 
intensified: “Generally accepted figures show that by 1990 100.000 people had lost 
their lives as a result of the fighting and up to 4 million (one third of the entire 
population) had been made refugees or been displaced” (Newitt 1995:571). When 
situated inside Mozambique, Renamo changed its tactics. While maintaining the 
terrorization of the population, they also took advantage of and contributed to the 
hostility between Frelimo and traditional authorities. A growing opposition to Frelimo, 
mainly within the peasantry, made them an easy pray for exploitation by Renamo 
forces (Newitt 1995).  
With the changes in South Africa in 1990, there was an increasing pressure on 
Frelimo, also by its external aid donors, to end the conflict. Frelimo entered in talks 
with Renamo, and in November constitutional changes were made to allow multi-party 
elections and end the one-party rule. From having been enemies in a civil war, Frelimo 
and Renamo were now becoming the two largest political parties in Mozambique. The 
final ceasefire was signed 15 October 1992. By this time the Frelimo government was 
extremely weakened by the challenges it had gone through, and now its weakness 
became apparent: The collapse of the economy left officials unpaid and lead to 
corruption, the army was demoralized, the public services and the industry were in 
strikes and in 1992 another severe drought added to the suffering of the Mozambican 
people (Newitt 1995). This made Mozambique even more dependent on external aid. 
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3.5 Aid dependency 
Already in the mid-1970s, Mozambique took its first steps in the direction of aid 
dependency. Access to international credit was great, and real rates of interest low. It 
was an opportunity for the countries in the Third World to start a development process 
using cheap international financial means. But after the second oil crisis in 1980/81, 
the rates of interests increased, and made the debt burden unbearable. Within two years 
Mozambique was forced to take out new loans to cover debt repayments 
(Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1995). 
During the early 80s, Mozambique needed emergency aid due to famine, but it proved 
difficult to get enough support from Western donors (Hanlon 1991:28-29). This was 
much due to the Western scepticism towards the Marxist government, and Frelimo was 
forced to turn to the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc for assistance. Because of the 
Cold War and its own material problems, the Soviet Union was no longer that 
ambitious with their commitments in the Third World in the 1980s (Abrahamsson and 
Nilsson 1995:98; Newitt 1995:560). Frelimo searched for a way out, not depending on 
either the East or the West. They signed the peace agreement and joined the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1984. But they did not yet abandon socialism, 
and they were not willing to adapt all conditionalities set by the donors (Hanlon 
1991:120-121). For the West, aid to Marxist states in Africa became a way of 
preventing communism from spreading (Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1995:133). As 
Mozambique did not get what they needed from the East block countries, they were 
slowly forced to turn to the West. Hence, Western aid started to pour in, but only 
slowly, as the West tried to pressure for policy changes. The policy of destabilization 
increased in 1986, and Frelimo was forced to choose the “Western way”. In 1987, 
Frelimo agreed to the demands set by the IMF (Hanlon 1991:28ff). In this 
environment, Mozambique’s socialist ideology was hard to maintain, and at the fifth 
party congress in 1989 Frelimo abandoned their role as a socialist party, adjusting to 
the demands of the development partners (Hanlon 1991:48).  
I will go more extensively into the implications of aid dependency as I discuss the 
development aid partnership in chapter 4. 
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3.6 Towards democracy 
With the introduction of a multi-party regime in 1990, the liberal press law from 1991, 
the ceasefire from 1992 and the parliamentary and presidential elections in October 
1994, big steps towards democratization in Mozambique were taken (Weimer 2000). 
The development aid agencies seem to regard Mozambique’s development as one of 
the few Sub-Saharan successes of the 1990s (Braathen and Orre 2001:199). But the 
political scientists Einar Braathen and Aslak Orre question this success-story, and 
claim that elections are not enough for democracy to have been implemented; there is 
also a need for the institutionalization of a democratic culture (Braathen and Orre 
2001).  
Braathen (2003) argues that the process of democratization in Mozambique is in many 
ways on a downturn. On the first elections in 1994, won by Frelimo, there was a voter 
turnout of 85% (Braathen 2003:4). A law was sustained for decentralization of power 
and the introduction of municipal elections. But after these first elections Frelimo 
became more reluctant to power sharing, Braathen claims. The laws to implement 
decentralization were changed, and the implementation postponed and carried out to a 
lesser extent (Braathen 2003:4). Braathen argues that this signifies a process of 
repatrimonialisation, a tendency of centralization and concentration of power: “The 
co-opting party regards the other parties as an obstacle to its hegemony, and to some 
extent turns society and the state into its own property” (Mazula cited in Braathen 
2003:3). Repatrimonialisation is an obstacle for the further democratization of 
Mozambique, and for instance it delayed the first municipal elections, that were not 
held until 1998. The opposition boycotted these elections because of the change in 
attitude from Frelimo, resulting in a voter turnout of only 14,48% (Braathen 2003:7).  
Braathen (2003) holds that this law participation is due to the boycott and also the use 
of a language of force which characterized the campaigns, reminding the 
Mozambicans too much of the past: “The two main parties both took substantial issues 
out of politics, and preferred making general propaganda” (Braathen and Orre 
2001:225). Braathen claims that all in all the political system in Mozambique is 
threatened by destabilization; criminalization of the state; delegitimization of the 
political, administrative and legal systems; and militarization of politics (Braathen 
2003:15-16).  
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Weimer agrees in this, as he argues that the results of a country’s second elections are 
descriptive for its democratic state. The 1999 presidential elections show that 
Mozambique has still a long way to go before democracy is consolidated, he claims 
(Weimer 2000:6). The 1999 elections were again won by Frelimo, there was a voter 
turnout of 75% and there was no boycott in advance (Braathen and Orre 2001:201). 
But Weimer points to the fact that the results of the elections were not accepted by the 
opposition. International observers could neither guarantee that fraud had not taken 
place. Thus, Renamo chose to boycott following political debates and votes (Weimer 
2000). The result is a political crisis where the opposition, although it is the 
dominating party in some provinces, is not acknowledged, and where the common 
belief in national institutions that are important to a democracy, is harmed (Weimer 
2000). There is also a total lack of consensus of the political rules of game between 
Frelimo and Renamo; there are no rational discussions between the ruling-party and 
the opposition (Weimer 2000:10-11). Braathen holds that the destabilization noticeable 
from 1998 has persisted with increased strength, as the campaign carried out by the 
opposition to reject the legitimacy of the 1999 elections was violently struck down by 
the government (Braathen 2003).  
An illustration of the situation of repatremonialisation and destabilisation of the 
Mozambican society is the high level of corruption. This is one of the main obstacles 
for democratization in many African countries today. 
3.6.1 Corruption 
The economist Alan Doig (2000) argues that corruption is a constraint to democracy, 
because the common values of a country are not used for the common good, but rather 
to enrich individuals. At the same time, democratization is put forward by the 
international community as a means to solve the problem of corruption and further 
development, he claims. Doig argues that the problem is not solved through 
democratization; he rather questions whether new types of corruption might appear in 
this process. Nevertheless, Doig (2000:14) upholds democracy and its qualities, and 
emphasizes its characteristics of criticism, opposition and participation.  
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The many regional and international conventions against corruption over the last years 
illustrate how common the problem of corruption is7. These agreements are important 
steps on the way to fight corruption, but much still depends on how they are followed-
up and monitored.  
The economist David Stasavage argues that corruption is a serious problem in 
Mozambique and that it has been increasing in a ten-year period until 1996 (Stasavage 
2000:65).  Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI)8 shows 
that Mozambique has gone from 3,5 in 1999 to 2,7 in 2003, which means the 
corruption is wide-spread, and has become worse (Transparency International 1999; 
Transparency International 2003). One of the most well-known cases of corruption in 
Mozambique is the bank fraud connected to the privatization of Banco Commercial de 
Moçambique in 1996, which believably led to the assassination of the journalist Carlos 
Cardoso, who disclosed the affair.  As a result, two businessmen, the Maputo branch 
manager of the bank and five local contract killers were arrested and 39 police officers 
were dismissed (Transparency International 2001:55). Stasavage (2000:95) claims that 
the problem of corruption is not addressed in a serious manner in Mozambique, and 
that there are no planned reforms to solve the problem. During my stay in Maputo, 
there was another case of corruption that got immense media-attention. A Swedish 
audit report concluded that the financial management system within the education 
sector was not satisfyingly run. Funds provided from the donors to increase the 
capacity of the ministry’s personnel had been used for other non-intended means, and 
there were different speculations and versions of how they had been used (Savana 
Semanário Independente 9.4.2004; Savana Semanário Independente 23.4.2004). Even 
though these events are made known in the press, one might question if a society, in 
which this can occur, is stabilized according to democratic ideals.  
 
7 In December 2003 the UN Convention against Corruption was signed by 95 countries (United Nations 2004). The African 
Union, amongst others, has followed this up, with the “Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption and Related 
Offences” (Transparency International 2004:117). 
8 Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) gives an overview of the level of corruption in different 
countries in the world, as it is seen by business people, academics and risk analysts. The CPI operates with an index from 10 
(highly clean) to 0 (highly corrupt) (Transparency International 1999; Transparency International 2003). 
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Nevertheless, Braathen and Orre (2001) argue that they believe that the tendency of 
destabilization will not last. Braathen rejects the patrimonial democracy, argued by 
some to be the new paradigm for Africa, as an alternative for Mozambique: 
[T]he political elites on the domestic scene cannot expect to play the game of 
repatrimonialisation and destabilization indefinitely without being punished 
by (i) a war-weary electorate, (ii) a maturing civil society, and (iii) new 
popular movements demanding real democracy and social economic justice 
(Braathen 2003:20).  
Such patrimonialism would be modernization without development;   importation of 
democracy and other political features, implemented in an instrumentalist manner, he 
claims. Braathen does not think that this will be viable in Mozambique, as the forces of 
democratization and repatrimonialisation clearly exist in deep conflict in the 
Mozambican society today (Braathen 2003).  
The recent period is consequently one of important events to Mozambique, and in this 
setting, education for citizenship might play an important role. This emphasis is 
evident in Mozambique, as they are now implementing education for citizenship as a 
new subject in school: Educação Moral e Cívica9. I see the implementation of this 
subject as instrumental for the democratization of Mozambique. I also view it as an 
indication of the commitment to democratization from the Mozambican government, 
and a sign of the need for state-building and creation of national identity. 
3.7 Summary; a history lacking democratic experience 
The historical outline has shown that the Mozambicans lack democratic experience, 
and that their history of colonization and an authoritarian regime has contributed to this 
situation. This lack is also clearly evident in the present situation in Mozambique, as 
there are still huge obstacles for a genuine democratization of Mozambique. 
Corruption is an increasing problem, and the politicians are in many ways contributing 
to a repatrimonialisation and destabilization of the political system in Mozambique. I 
 
9This is the new Mozambican subject of moral and civic education, a subject that should be integrated in the other subjects from 1st 
to 5th grade, while in 6th and 7th grade it is taught as a subject of its own. It covers themes ranging from the family and local 
community to Mozambique’s relation to the international and global community. Within the limits of this master thesis I am not 
able to go further into the concrete content of the subject, even though this would be interesting (See: Inde/Unesco 2001a; 
Inde/Unesco 2001 b; Inde/Unesco 2001 c; Inde/Unesco 2001 d). I rather focus on this subject’s role in general, as Mozambican 
education’s most important tool in the process of democratization. 
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am of the opinion that education for citizenship is helpful in this situation. The lack of 
democratic experience needs to be diminished. The Mozambican people have to 
participate in, and experience, democracy. In this respect, education for citizenship can 
be instrumental. I have shown to the introduction of education for citizenship as a 
school subject in Mozambique as one positive development in the present situation. In 
the following chapter, I continue to outline the Mozambican context and the backdrop 
of the process of democratization, by providing an overview of the development aid 
relationship in general, and in Mozambique in particular.  
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4. DEVELOPMENT AID AND ITS CRITICS 
The aid agencies and the donor community have a saying in policy planning, and are 
powerful participants on the political agenda in Mozambique. Nevertheless, 
development aid is an issue of great controversies and dilemmas. In this chapter I 
outline some of the recent development aid strategies and its critics, and I mainly focus 
on the development aid within the education sector. Democratization is emphasized by 
the development aid agents, as a means of development (4.1). But the same agents also 
make use of undemocratic methods in their work, as conditionalities connected to aid 
have been common (4.2). The new SWAps and the rhetoric of partnership and local 
ownership are warmly welcomed in this context, and seem to entail positive features to 
improve the aid relationship. But at present, the development aid partnership appears 
not to function according to its intentions (4.3). In this setting, it is of outmost 
importance that the Mozambican people are also able to take part and influence the 
processes. One important step in that direction is to have a well-functioning 
development aid partnership, which the Mozambicans are able to control. I argue that 
this is another reason for the need for education for citizenship (4.4). 
4.1 Development through democratization 
Until the end of the cold war, democracy and democratization was of little concern on 
the African policy agenda, and it was even viewed as opposed to development, being 
too time-consuming and inefficient. The need for rapid development demanded quick 
solutions, and democratic disputations were not seen as desirable by the African 
leaders (Daddieh 1998: 45-46). But the political scientist Cyril Daddieh (1998) claims 
that since the late 1980s there has been a change in the view on democracy, and 
democratic transitions are taking place all over Africa. The social scientist Claude Ake 
argues that the focus on good governance and democratization is now obvious on the 
aid agenda. There is a whole movement of different stakeholders, fighting for 
democracy in Africa today. International NGOs, international financial institutions, 
Western governments, local grass root organizations, African elite and ordinary 
people; all have their own special interests and views on what the result and the 
process of democratization in Africa should be (Ake 1993:239). The World Bank 
(2004b:271) emphasizes that good governance is connected to poverty. With weak 
governance the people that need public services the most, will not get them, and the 
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poor are most likely to suffer. Hence, the World Bank attempts to “develop a 
subsequent operational strategy for good governance in support of poverty reduction” 
(World Bank 2004b:271). I find the following quote representative for what I view as 
typical Western democratic arrangements, and this seems to be what is encouraged by 
the World Bank:  
[The existence of accountability and transparency] is closely linked to the 
architecture of the state, which defines the relationships among the executive, 
legislature, and judiciary, and the extent to which they are able to scrutinize 
each other’s behavior. Accountability and transparency also depend on other 
institutional arrangements for the transfer of power between governments, 
including voting arrangements and electoral laws. (The World Bank 2004b: 
276). 
There is no doubt that external partners have an important role to play in encouraging 
and securing a democratic development. This is, however, not an unproblematic 
matter, as I will discuss throughout this chapter. In chapter 5 I will go more at length 
with the problems of a pure transfer of a Western democracy to Africa.  
The World Bank is also very much involved in the construction of educational policy 
in Sub-Saharan Africa. Brock-Utne claims that this has contributed to a surprising 
congruence amongst the educational policies of the different agencies (Brock-Utne 
2000:70ff). There has of course been controversy connected to aid policies within the 
donor community10, but even so, some main tendencies remain. It is therefore helpful 
to take a closer look at some of the World Bank policies, in order to understand the 
historical development of the aid relationship. 
4.2 Aid conditionality and the World Bank policy  
When it comes to aid and conditionality, Roger C. Riddell, researcher on development 
issues, states that aid is not only given for development purposes. Aid is also given to 
obtain other non- development objectives; to have political influence on the recipient 
countries or to help increasing domestic export (Riddell 1997:459). The educationist 
Göran Linde (2000) argues that during the 60s and 70s, the posing of conditionality or 
imposition was considered taboo, but in the 1980s, aid was given on stricter terms and 
 
10 By donor community (or developing agents) I here mean all agencies that cooperate and take part in the development of 
different countries. I will later talk about the donor community in Mozambique. 
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to a greater extent on the givers’ conditions. Linde (2000:204) argues that a situation of 
influence is natural and inevitable, and he maintains that development on the 
recipients’ terms was not an appropriate solution for development, due to the high 
levels of corruption in many recipient countries. He argues that in cultures where 
people have strong connections to family and tribe, the discrepancy between personal 
and national interests can be difficult to maintain. He is however aware that the 
increased cooperation and focus on the quality of education might contribute to 
increased donor-power, and therefore a need for further focus on the aid relationship 
and conditionality Linde (2000). Brock-Utne (2000) focuses on the natural asymmetry 
in the aid relationship, where one party donates the money, and the other receives 
them. This uneven power relationship will unavoidably contribute to difficulties in 
balancing the aid relationship. Brock-Utne goes as far as to claim that the donors have 
probably caused more harm than good for the education sector in Africa, and that 
“over the last fifteen years under the donor pressures of structural adjustment an 
intellectual recolonization of Africa has taken place” (Brock-Utne 2000:289).  
The (Economic) Structural Adjustment Programs ((E)SAPs) were introduced by the 
World Bank in the mid-1980s to enhance economic development in Africa. These 
programs reflected a belief in the free market and limitation of power for the state, and 
they have been widely criticized (Heynemann 2003:326). The educationists and 
africanists Kenneth King and Simon McGrath claim that the emphasis on economic 
growth did not lead to decreased inequality (King and McGrath 2002:42). The 
downsizing of the state is now being reconsidered, as the importance of the state as a 
catalyst for development again is on the agenda (King and McGrath 2002). Within the 
education sector the (E)SAPs had great influence. Privatization, decentralization, user 
fees, and focus on basic education as general prescriptions, was not what the 
developing countries needed. School enrolments were declining in countries with 
(E)SAPs (Alexander 2002:2111).   
Hanlon argues that this policy had negative effects on Mozambique as well: 
“Structural adjustment accelerated privatization and social differentiation. Poverty and 
hunger became more widespread, while conspicuous wealth and consumption 
 
11 Article found on the web, page number from print-out. 
 
 
36
increased. Health and education, the two pillars of Frelimo’s popularity, were hit hard 
by destabilization and structural adjustment” (Hanlon 1991:279). Hanlon refers to 
reviews done by the World Bank and the IMF, where they themselves agree that the 
budget for social welfare was squeezed to a “dysfunctional” level (Hanlon 1991:137). 
The educationist David Plank argues that the Mozambican government at the time was 
viewed as “easy to work with” (Plank 1993:32, my translation). The recommendations 
put forward by the IMF and the World Bank was seldom rejected, the government 
knowing that this was the easiest way to ensure continuation of aid funds (Plank 1993).  
There has nevertheless been a shift in the newer aid rhetoric, which now focuses 
immensely on terms like partnership and local ownership, as we shall see in the 
following. 
4.3 SWAps, PRSPs and ESSPs: A new era of partnership or 
ongoing conditionality? 
Former adviser in DANIDA, Ole Mølgård Andersen (2000), claims that during the 
1980s the aid community turned much of their aid resources into program support 
instead of direct project support. This resulted in a decrease in their strong, direct 
control with the funds. It soon turned out that the money were not always used as they 
were supposed to, and therefore, during the 1990s Sector Wide Approaches (SWAps) 
became the new development aid strategy, identified within different donor agencies. 
The new approach gave recipient countries and the donors shared responsibility for the 
development cooperation (Andersen 2000:179). The SWAp is a more holistic approach 
to development aid, and in some ways an answer to the criticism of the (E)SAPs.  
Within a SWAp, one should consider development more integrally, and take all 
accounts into consideration, not only focusing on limited projects or universal 
solutions. The educationist Steven J. Klees claims that a genuine SWAp is said to be: 
“sector-wide; based on a clear and coherent policy framework; local stakeholders are 
supposed to be fully in charge; all main donors must agree to it; implementation must 
be developed jointly; and it should depend on local capacity, not technical assistance” 
(Klees 2001:2). Preferably all aid agencies involved in a sector, the local government 
and civil society are brought together to create a national policy for the different 
sectors. The increased cooperation between the different donors and between donors 
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and government is supposed to contribute to better dialogue and partnership 
cooperation; the process should be more transparent and efficient. The intention is to 
give the local governments more ownership of their policy planning (Klees 2001). 
Basket- and budget funding is part of this picture, where donors provide funds to a 
common basket, to be used for the whole sector according to government policies. 
Andersen claims that this is essential for effective donor-coordination, and argues that 
it is necessary that funds are channelled through the national budgets in order to have a 
system where the money is accounted for (Andersen 2000:187-188). Another result of 
the basket funding, one might argue, is that the national governments may become 
more independent if they get support through the budget, and themselves decide the 
priorities to be done. But this still depends on the degree of conditionality connected to 
the funding.  
The change to the SWAp happened at a time with much focus on cooperation in the 
development aid arena. In 1990 in Jomtien, Thailand, the Education for All (EFA)-
declaration was sustained, stating that education is a universal right for all (Brock-Utne 
2000; Unesco 1990). In 2000 at The World Education Forum in Dakar, Senegal, it was 
determined that the EFA-goal should be reached by 2015 (Unesco 2000:15). This 
focus on education is also seen in the UN Millennium goals, one of them being to 
reach Universal Primary Education by the year 2015 (Unesco 2002). In 2001, the 
Fast-Track Initiative (FTI), a plan to escalate the process of education for all, was 
sustained. The FTI implies that countries that meet certain criteria, and that work for 
the EFA goal, shall have the resources necessary to be able to accomplish their 
strategies and plans. The criteria to become one of the FTI-countries are that the 
country has a Poverty Reduction Strategy Plan (PRSP) and/or an Education Sector 
Strategy Plan (ESSP), in accordance with the donors. Mozambique is one out of 18 
countries that met the FTI-criteria (Takala 200312; World Bank 200413). The 
Mozambican PRSP, Programa de Acção para a Redução da Pobreza was produced in 
2001 (Republic of Mozambique 2001), and the ESSP, Plano Estratégico de Educação 
(Ministry of Education 1998) was introduced in 1998 and is now under revision. The 
production of all these plans is done in an environment of cooperation through 
 
12 Document without pagination, page number 5 on print-out. 
13 Document without pagination, page number 3 on print-out 
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partnership between the government and its development aid partners. The question is 
whether this partnership signifies a new era of aid relationship, or if it is still 
characterized by conditionality. 
4.3.1 Rhetoric and reality 
The mentioned documents connected to the strategy change mirror a shift in the 
development aid rhetoric. Terms like cooperation, partnership and local ownership are 
frequently used. Klees (2001) argues that the term partnership is rapidly becoming 
well-used by all parts involved in development circles, where almost all activities are 
based on partnership. Close to all agents are included, and the best example of such a 
partnership is Education for All (EFA), where nearly every country in the world is a 
partner. Since everybody is cooperating, no one is to blame, and no one criticizes 
(Klees 2001:2). Within the donor community, partnership is viewed as positive for 
local ownership and the inclusion of civil society; it contributes to the development of 
local capacity building, transparency and openness. But partnership could also be a 
way of choosing the countries that make the best partners, the ones that are willing to 
adopt the policies considered rational (King and McGrath 2002:49). Simon Maxwell is 
also concerned that the maximization of participation and cooperation will blur 
conflicts between the partners, and create a false impression of the situation (Maxwell 
2003:15). Klees (2001) maintains that it is impossible to believe the rhetoric of 
partnership, and points to research done, showing that real participation in the PRSP 
process was non-existent, the PRSPs looked little different than the (E)SAPs of the 
previous decade, with minimum attention to the social sector protection, and with 
stringent loan conditionalities. Klees argues that the SWAps are wrapped in a holistic, 
participatory, partnership language; we have “a SAP in SWAPs clothing” (Klees 
2001:5). He admits that this rhetoric shift is progressive in some respects, the rhetoric 
shift is important in itself, but all these changes also legitimize the system.  
It is also usually agreed that sector-support should strengthen local ownership. The FTI 
framework states that local ownership is one of its guiding principles: “The FTI is a 
country-driven process, with the primary locus of activity and decision-making at the 
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country level” (World Bank 200414). But in a closed meeting of the African ministers 
of education in 1993, concern was expressed that the understanding of the term 
ownership was unclear, and that more information on the issue was needed (Donors to 
African Education 1994). In this meeting the ministers also reflected on the 
relationship between donors and recipient countries: 
While they appreciate the contribution of donors to the development of 
education in Africa, the ministers expressed serious concern about the way in 
which conditionality is imposed on African countries when assistance is 
provided. They cannot accept conditions being imposed unilaterally and they 
would like this issue to be fully discussed in a spirit of partnership. The 
ministers hope that the donors will give full consideration to this issue. 
(Donors to African Education 1994:27).  
Even though progress might have been made, the rhetoric shift is not sufficient to 
change the practical reality. As with the (E)SAPs from the 1980s, conditionalities are 
still part of the development aid reality within the present SWAps.  
The political scientist Joel Samoff agrees with Klees, as he points to the fact that 
evolving terminologies do not necessarily imply changed practice (Samoff 2003). 
Samoff argues that rather than providing a change, the overwhelming cooperation and 
coordination between donors will lead to the opposite. He points to the fact that 
external governments, international agencies and other international organizations still 
have great influence on the different countries’ educational policy, by imposing 
conditionality in the sector-support-process (Samoff 2003:289). Some argues that the 
PRSPs and the SWAp makes it even worse, since the external agencies can influence 
not only the areas where they provide loans, but a nations’ entire development strategy 
(Klees 2001:3; Alexander 2002:40). Even worse so, the shedding of responsibility 
through this approach is evident. Klees argues that the World Bank recommends 
actions to be taken, but if these recommendations turn out to give a bad result, this is 
due to causes outside the control of the World bank and not their responsibility (Klees 
2001:6). 
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4.3.2 Education sector partnership in Mozambique 
Mozambique is also following the changing trends of international development aid. 
The first Education Sector Strategic Plan came about after a process started by the 
government in 1995. In September 1997 the ministry of Education and its international 
partners signed a joint aid memoir, where it was confirmed that the making of the 
strategic framework was a “significant step away from fragmented, project-based 
cooperation and funding arrangements, towards an integrated programme approach to 
development in the education sector” (Ministry of Education, Republic of 
Mozambique and International Development Agencies 1997:2). Within this document, 
some concerns were raised to be resolved, until the final joint appraisal could be signed 
by the ministry and its international donor partners in 1998 (Ministry of Education, 
Republic of Mozambique and International Development Agencies 1997). The joint 
statement is an agreement that the ESSP is to function as a framework for the Sector 
Wide Program Support, “an adequate basis on which donors can commit funding” 
(Ministry of Education and International Donor Partners 1998:2). Mozambique had got 
its first educational policy as a result of a SWAp, approved by the donors. In this 
document the partners claim that: “The process has deepened understanding of the 
sector-wide approach, strengthened the partnership, and fostered greater understanding 
and commitment between the Government and its donor partners” (Ministry of 
Education and International Donor Partners 1998:5). The partners included in this 
SWAp were representatives for the ministry of Education, for the ministry of Planning 
and Finance, and for the donor community15 (Ministry of Education and International 
Donor Partners 1998:1).  
But reports from one of the main donor partners show that the process has not been 
without complications. SIDA’s regional education adviser, Agneta Lind, claims that: 
“From having been well known as a positive SWAp process, the education sector 
programme in Mozambique seems to have become rather problematic and a real 
concern for partners such as Sweden, Ireland and Holland, who so actively have 
supported the process” (Lind 2002: 4). The 3rd and 4th quarterly reports still express 
 
15 Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), Danish 
International Development Agency (DANIDA), Department for International Development (DFID), European Union (EU), 
Finland, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), The United Nations 
Population Fund (UNFPA), World Food Programme (WFP), World Bank 
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concern for the process, and Lind (2003:5) claims that the “dependency syndrome” has 
taken over for the focus on local ownership. It seems as if the partners have not been 
able to follow through with the intentions of the process, as stated in the early 
documents.  
Tuomas Takala and Mmantsetsa Marope have done a study for the Association for the 
Development of Education in Africa (ADEA) Working Group on Education Sector 
Analysis, and it shows that there exist different understandings between the partners in 
the education sector about what the SWAp, and especially the term partnership, means 
(Takala and Marope 2003:7). They claim that “it is not unlikely that the genuine 
partnership that is characterized by joint decision-making, joint ownership and shared 
control would be seriously curtailed by imbalances in understanding between the 
negotiating partners” (Takala and Marope 2003:16). Their Mozambican interviewees 
felt that they were not in control when decisions within the education sector were to be 
taken, and they could not set the terms for the partnership. Nevertheless, Takala and 
Marope claim that if the introduction of the SWAp cannot be characterized as 
successful, it is at least in the progress of reaching a workable partnership (Takala and 
Marope 2003:16). Lene Buchert compared the SWAp partnerships in Burkina-Faso, 
Ghana and Mozambique, and even though she claims that these countries have a long 
way to go, she got an impression of a Mozambican SWAp that was more inclusive and 
with a partnership that functioned better than in the other two countries (Buchert 
2002:78). She claims, contrary to Takala and Marope, that the national capacity in 
Mozambique was good, and led to increased local ownership and a more genuine 
partnership (Buchert 2002:82).  
4.4 Summary; democratic partnership for democracy? 
Even though Buchert (2002) claims that the partnership in Mozambique functions 
relatively better than other places, one might question to what degree one can 
characterize this relationship as democratic. The conditionalities set within the 
development aid partnership, even after the rhetorical change, imply that the 
partnership is not functioning according to its intentions -it cannot be said to be a 
genuine partnership. One can, of course, understand the development agents’ need to 
secure the use of money provided, as there are undemocratic characteristics of the 
Mozambican society.  But how can developing countries develop in a democratic 
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manner, when the political processes are not democratic in as such, but rather forced 
upon the African people? There has to be a careful balance between the imposing of 
conditionalities and the realization of local ownership. It is important that the 
Mozambicans are able to influence and control the impact that the development agents 
have on Mozambique. The Mozambicans need to get an understanding of the 
mechanisms evident in the Mozambican society, the development aid partnership 
included. In that respect, education for citizenship plays an important role.  
If the Mozambican people are not themselves able to control the development of their 
country, one could go so far as to say that the pressure of the introduction of 
democracy in Africa is a contradiction in terms. All changes, and perhaps changes for 
democracy in particular, need to be based on a feeling of ownership amongst the 
people that are influenced by them. I return to this in the following chapter, as I go on 
to discuss the term democracy and the problems with the pressure for a transfer of a 
Western-type democracy to Africa. 
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5. DEMOCRACY AND ITS TRANSFER 
While there still seems to be a way to go before a satisfactory level of democracy is 
reached in Mozambique, it is important to look into how the democratization is 
conducted. To be able to do this, I first have to consider the term democracy. The 
concept of democracy is wide, and democracy theorists have divergent understandings 
of the term. It can be applied differently to varying contexts and be adjusted to the 
context it is placed within (5.1). There are implications of the African context that need 
to be taken into consideration when a democracy is to be created in Mozambique. The 
“traditional African societies” entail features that one must be aware of to avoid an 
undemocratic development, but they also imply significant positive contributions when 
it comes to a more communal and solidarity thinking (5.2). The present socio-political 
situation entails obstacles for democratization, as well, as the liberal market policy and 
the liberal democracy promoted by development agents does not take the present 
African context into account (5.3). This situation implies that we are in need of a new 
thinking concerning the democratization of developing countries, and so also in 
Mozambique. The Western liberal democracy cannot be transferred to the African 
context, as it is not capable of taking care of the specific problems of Africa. A more 
dynamic definition (5.4) of democracy is needed in the present situation of 
democratization of the developing countries. I argue that equal participation by all 
should be encouraged, and therefore, education for citizenship becomes instrumental.  
5.1 Types of democracies 
The word democracy comes from Greek Demos (the people) and kratein (to rule), and 
signifies “rule by the people” (Sono 1993:8). The origin of democracy is the Athens 
and its direct democracy, where all citizens took active part in decision-making 
through general assemblies or direct elections (Rasch 1998:7). This kind of direct 
democracy, however, is not common, since the small city-state does no longer exist. 
The political scientist and economist Themba Sono, claims that due to an increased 
number of inhabitants and a larger geographical area, a direct rule by the people would 
be practically difficult (Sono 1993). The political scientist Bjørn Erik Rasch maintains 
that indirect democracies are a practical solution to the present manifestation of the 
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democratic ideal, where representatives are chosen to make the decisions (Rasch 
1998:7). 
One type of indirect democracy is the competitive democracy, where representatives 
compete for votes. The voters act strategically, and according to personal interests. 
Diverging interest and individual rights are taken care of through elections (Rasch 
1998:8-9). With Hobbes as a grounding father, the Western, competitive democracies 
are often labelled liberal democracies. The liberal democracy is characterized by a 
belief in the value of individual freedom; every citizen should be free to follow his or 
her own intentions, without limiting the freedom of others (Langhelle 1998:66). This 
implies that neutrality is essential; in a society of citizens of different opinions, there is 
a need for neutrality towards questions concerning the good life. This ideal of 
neutrality is questioned by the political scientist Bo Lindensjö, who argues that it is an 
impossible ideal. He also questions the desirability of a value neutral state or policy, as 
for instance racism or sexism should not be tolerated (Lindensjö 1999:20). The 
competitive democracy-type has also been criticized for the limited participation by its 
citizens, restricted to elections once in a while (Rasch 1998:9). The political scientist 
Carole Pateman (1970:7) also criticizes this. She argues that within the recent theories 
of democracy, the apathy of the citizens is instrumental for the sustenance of the 
system. Due to the citizens argued lack of interest in political issues, restriction and 
limitation of their participation is needed. According to Pateman, these theories view a 
rule by an enlightened elite - or oligarchy as she labels it - as more effective than the 
chaos resulting from the maximization of participation by the masses (Pateman 
1970:2).  
Pateman (1970) forwards the participatory democracy as an alternative. This, it can be 
argued, comes closer to the original ideal of democracy. She argues that representation 
is not sufficient for democracy. The democratic ideal of maximum participation of all 
the people demand that individuals and their institutions cannot be seen in isolation. 
Participation requires socialization and democratic training through participation, and 
this is done at the best on the local level. Issues on the local level concern the 
individuals and their everyday life, and this is where the individual can better influence 
decisions taken. Through the emphasis on participation, this system is self-sustaining. 
Participation aids the acceptance of collective decisions and furthers socialization into 
continued participation (Pateman 1970:42-43). This is also important with Freire, as 
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people need to experience the political and social responsibility, through participation 
and intervention in their own local societies, to be able to contribute to a democratic 
development (Freire 1974: 36). The pedagogical character of this view on democracy 
is evident. 
The deliberative democracy is put forward by the philosopher and sociologist Jürgen 
Habermas, and implies that decisions are warranted when they are justified through 
reasons that are acceptable for all (Eriksen and Weigård 1999:172). The participants 
should be able to outline their individual and autonomous views for discussion, and in 
this way their individual freedom is secured. These views are then to be transformed 
through discourse, through the encounter with other individuals’ views, so that they 
become acceptable for all, and a dimension is added: The common good. This is the 
process of deliberation or rational communication, where dialogue and the use of 
rational judgment decide the outcome. The objective is to convince the other 
participants through rational argumentation, and come to agreement. This demands 
equality and symmetry between the partners, as genuine conversion demands that the 
others accept one’s argument as valid on autonomous grounds (Eriksen and Weigård 
1999). As I see it, the deliberative democracy is connected to the participatory 
democracy, and can function as the procedures to be used within such a democracy. 
There is a wide range of other types of democracies described, but I have found this 
outline suitable for my purposes. Sono (1993) claims that the term democracy is used 
widely, and maybe uncritically, in various situations. He criticizes this, as he finds that 
the understanding of the term democracy has been redefined, to the extent that one can 
call just about everything a democracy. This confusion makes criticism difficult, and 
therefore it is of great importance to be clear on what one understands by democracy 
(Sono 1993:2-5). Even if democracy as it was originally intended does not exist today, 
we still have ideals connected to governance, and these are often described as 
democracy. Since democracy is put forward as an ideal in the present debates, we need 
to define it, and since it no longer exists in its form of origin, it seems appropriate to 
redefine the term according to the present context. I attempt to offer a definition of the 
term for the use of this thesis, but first I need to take a closer look at the African 
context; its democratic characteristics; its ability to further democratization; and the 
problems of a pure transfer of the Western-type, liberal democracy. 
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5.2 Democracy and the traditional African societies 
There are continuous discussions of the extent to which the traditional, pre-colonial 
African societies can be said to have had democratic features, and how this tradition 
and culture influence the possibilities for the rooting of democratic systems in the 
present Africa. In the following, some of the characteristics of the indigenous African 
societies are addressed, and I investigate how this interrelates with the Western 
democratic ideal. I know, of course, that I am now moving into a difficult area. There 
is not one traditional African society. Earlier, as now, there were differences along 
geographical, cultural and religious lines, and one needs to be careful not to end up 
with an over-simplistic outline. My intentions are, however, not to give a complete 
picture of the traditional African societies, but rather to provide a simplistic backdrop 
to their democratic tendencies, and also to discuss the problems related to the pure 
transfer of a Western, liberal democracy to Africa.  
5.2.1 Communality and consensus 
Even though I have argued that the Mozambicans lack democratic experience as we 
view it in the West, some of the pre-colonial, traditional African societies hold several 
characteristics which can be said to have been democratic. A tradition discussed by 
Sono is kikuyu, a system of government in Africa prior to colonization. Sono (1993:49) 
holds that this system, to some extent, was democratic. It had a fairly democratic 
structure, with the family unit as the starting point. The heads of some of the families 
constituted the village council, where the oldest was elected president. These councils 
normally consisted of men only, which is of course an undemocratic trait. The group of 
presidents represented the villages in the government. There was also a district 
council, comprised of all the elders in the district. A group (ndundu) of the senior 
elders presided, and the oldest and presumably wisest was elected president. The 
fourth and last level was the national council, made up of the different ndundu’s, and 
representing the whole population. The system was based on no inheritable positions, 
and representatives that behaved contrary to accepted conduct could be dismissed. The 
representative talked on behalf of his group, and the system was entirely based on 
merit: “Collectivism was the norm, individualism was frowned upon” (Sono 1993:49). 
I see this tradition of communality as opposed to the individualistic, liberal democracy. 
Ake (1993:243) emphasizes the collective structure of the African traditional societies. 
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Their communal character is apparent as Africans rather see themselves as social 
beings, and not as much as individuals in competition, with conflicting interests from 
each other. Participation is important not because one need to get one’s individual 
interests affirmed, but because one should take part, show solidarity and share the 
burdens and rewards of belonging in a community. The African concept of 
participation is linked to communality and to the concept of being part of an organic 
whole (Ake 1993). Here, the concept of ubuntu is central. It represents a cultural 
world-view that intends to explain the essence of what it means to be human: “a person 
becomes a human being through his/her relation to other people” (Brock-Utne 
2004:115). Brock-Utne (2004) claims that the view on existence as existence through 
others, and the emphasis on participation and sharing, is in great contrast to the 
Western individual philosophy of existence: “Cogito, ergo sum”.  
This brings me on to another democratic characteristic of some pre-colonial African 
societies -the principle of participation. Kikuyu might also be seen as interlinked to the 
participatory democracy type. The starting point within the family could contribute to 
active participation by all on the local level. Sono (1993) claims that public 
involvement when decisions traditionally were to be made was evident in many early 
African cultures, discussions and compromises were methods used. The important 
thing was often to find the middle road, a solution that everyone could agree on, and 
hence, opposites needed to be blurred (Sono 1993:45). This tradition is termed palaver, 
which stems from Portuguese, and means “word, speech, discussion” (Brock-Utne 
2004:115). It is to be understood as conflict solving through negotiation. I see this 
indigenous tradition both in connection to the participatory democracy and the 
deliberative democracy in the tradition of Habermas, discussed earlier. The traditional 
African culture of consensus is questioned, though, and I return to it in the following 
section. 
5.2.2 Deference and authoritarian structures 
I have argued that the pre-colonial, traditional African societies can entail democratic 
characteristics. But in other aspects, they cannot. Reverence and acquiescence is 
deeply embedded in the African culture. Sono (1993:43) claims that the ancestors play 
an important and mythical role, making the Elders, who are the closest kins to the 
ancestors, natural authorities. Aging is a sign of experience and wisdom. The respect 
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of the elders and the constant reference to the past is thus a vital characteristic of the 
indigenous African societies (Sono 1993; Harber 1997).  In such a society, a person’s 
authority and status is decided from the relative position in the group, and group 
affiliation becomes important. But this can become a problem, as decisions are to be 
taken collectively as a group action, like the tradition of consensus and communality 
prescribe. Hence, Sono (1993:43) argues that group affiliation is not compatible with 
democracy. The objective of consensus and unanimity is a good one, it is a democratic 
aim, but the methods used in the traditional African societies cannot always be said to 
have been democratic (Sono 1993). They resemble an undemocratic, oligarchic 
system. And in this respect, I am of the opinion that the system of kikuyu can also be 
viewed as a representative, elite democracy, as power is concentrated to a few men. 
When the authority of the Elders gets so strong that the subordinates can do nothing 
but agree, the consensus reached in these civilizations might have been superficial. 
Agreement is the overall objective, dissent is not acceptable, and consent can be given 
out of the fear of being different. Sono (1993:42) claims that this is opposed to the 
Western societies, the civilizations of dissent, where consent ideally is given freely. 
Consequently, even though some traditional societies had procedures to control their 
rulers, the normal picture was “more authoritarian, with highly personalized rule, faith 
in the wisdom and justice of rulers rather than belief in laws and procedures, unequal 
rights of citizenship and the absence of formal opposition” (Chazan cited in Harber 
1997:14). 
One might see the contours of a division between, on the one hand, the Western 
democracy as rule by law, laws that can be changed and altered, and on the other hand 
a rule by norms, based in traditions that cannot be changed. The latter is not easy to 
view as democratic, even though the theoretical outline ha illustrated that it entails 
features that can contribute to the creation of a new, context-adjusted democracy for 
Africa. In the following I go on to the present African context, which also entails 
obstacles for democratization, especially for the simple transfer of a Western, liberal 
democracy. 
5.3 Democracy and the present African context 
Since the present African context is very much influenced by the traditional cultures of 
Africa, it is difficult to draw a sharp distinction between traditional and modern 
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African societies. The social anthropologist Antoine Lema claims that the values of 
consensus and reciprocity were preserved throughout the colonial era in the African 
rural areas. This was seen as a means of fighting against the colonial ideas (Lema 
1995:140). There are of course variations between regions and countries, and there are 
also huge differences between the urban and the rural areas, but traditional culture and 
beliefs are still vivid in Africa, and still part of the present African context. In the 
following sections I look at how the present socio-economic situation in Africa plays a 
role in the context of democratization. 
5.3.1 The economic and socio-political situation 
When it comes to more recent developments in the African context, the present 
economic and socio-political situation plays a vital role. Daddieh argues that the 
African socioeconomic conditions and inter-elite conflicts make the African 
democracies unstable and fragile, and contribute to the “reverse waves” of 
democracies falling back into undemocratic regimes (Daddieh 1998:56-57). Ake 
(1993:241) argues that an African democracy will not be viable and relevant unless it 
takes the economic component into account. The fight for democracy is very much a 
fight against poverty. Ordinary Africans see democratization as their political 
empowerment – essential for getting the economic agenda right.  
The political scientist Kidane Mengisteab also claims that the focus on individual 
freedom makes the liberal democracy unsuitable for the African context. Liberal 
democracy is often associated with capitalism, and its most important feature is to 
protect private property and individual freedom. State power is restricted, economic 
and political decisions are partitioned (Mengisteab 1999:25-26). This is in concordance 
with the aid approaches, and especially the (E)SAPs’ focus on market liberalism, 
without taking the social policy into account. In the African context, the state has an 
important role in redistributing the resources. As long as the liberal democracy does 
not have mechanisms to redistribute the resources, it will not be a viable system 
(Mengisteab 1999:26). 
The transfer of a Western, liberal democracy has important implications in this respect. 
The African democratization needs to take care of the interests of its social base. This 
implies economic intervention in the market place to ensure economic growth and 
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redistribution of economic wealth (Ake 1993:242). But this can be problematic 
because the “powerful sponsors- the African elite, Western nations and international 
development agencies” might see this as the degeneration of democracy into socialism 
(Ake 1993:242). Their belief in the West, market forces and orthodox liberal 
democracy, implies that the African democracy will not be given the opportunity to 
develop in a unique way. Ake (1993) emphasizes that the ordinary Africans are living 
in a pre-industrial, communal society, culturally different from our societies in the 
West. Daddieh (1998) claims that one needs to pay attention to Africans’ 
understanding of democracy, and thus get a better understanding of the political 
development in Africa. If not, one is in danger of misinterpreting the events, and even 
missing the creation of African democracy.  
5.4 Summary; towards a definition of democracy 
The term democracy has different manifestations, and the African context is clearly 
important in the creation of a Mozambican democracy. But a rule by norms, without 
possibility to influence and change the traditions that guide it, might not be a desired 
result. I see it as important that the principles and values originally inherent in the term 
democracy are preserved, if democracy is to be forwarded as an ideal at all. This 
chapter’s focus on different types of democracies has contributed in this respect, and 
has a saying in the discussions concerning a definition of a Mozambican democracy.  
The theoretical outline has shown that the Western-type democracy, or more precisely 
the neo-liberal democracy encouraged through the SAPs, and maybe also the present 
SWAPs, has obvious limitations for the African context. It is nevertheless important to 
keep in mind that its ideal of individual freedom connected to the importance of human 
rights is imperative to maintain. This is not to say that individual freedom is not taken 
care of within the other types of democracies. For instance the deliberative democracy 
secures individual freedom through the process of deliberation, in the search for the 
common good. In this I see less conflict between the individual and the common, and 
this is perhaps more in concordance with the African tradition of consensus and 
communality. The competitive democracy and party pluralism can also contribute to 
the democratization of Mozambique, as there are few alternatives to the representative 
democracy in a modern state. It is however not impossible that this could be executed 
in other ways than the one known until now, and maybe can African traditions 
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contribute to new thinking in this respect. I am of the opinion that the values of 
consensus and communality; the palaver tradition and the concept of ubuntu are 
important to bring forward and preserve in the process of democratization. I also think 
that it is important that elections are sustained in a decentralized manner, to prevent 
elite democracy or oligarchy, a possible outcome of the traditional belief in chiefs and 
authoritarian structures. Focus on the local level is also a natural outcome of the 
participatory democracy, which emphasizes maximum participation by as many as 
possible. This is in accordance with the original Greek democratic ideal, and a 
necessary component of all democracies, as I see it. I also see the advantages in a 
participatory democracy as an educational activity, as I do in the deliberative 
democracy. It puts the dialogue and communication between equals forward as a tool 
for reaching common decisions, something that I find a suitable ideal for a democracy, 
and also very much in concordance with the traditions of consensus and communality.  
I will nevertheless be careful in proposing any democratic formulae for Mozambique. 
The main point to be made is that the traditional and present implications of the 
African context need to be taken into account in this process. I am thus not suggesting 
a more detailed definition of democracy other than referring to the ideal of maximum 
participation by all on an equal basis. Whenever in the following I refer to “real” or 
“genuine” democracy, or simply “democracy”, I do not have any static or determined 
democracy in mind, but rather one that remains to be created, according to the context 
in which it is supposed to function. My definition of democracy implies increasing 
democratic experience, as is needed in Mozambique. But this also presupposes that the 
Mozambicans are informed and educated for participation. Hence, education for 
citizenship becomes important, and this is what I focus on in the following chapter. 
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6. EDUCATION FOR CITIZENSHIP 
Education, and the concept of education for citizenship, plays an important role in the 
context of democratization. For now, I have argued that education for citizenship is 
needed in the Mozambican context. But what is this education about? Education might 
function as a socializing- or reproducing agent, and also as a transforming- or change 
agent. The democratic nature of education conjuncts these two seemingly conflicting 
roles. It diminishes the dilemma of the possibly controversial aspects of conveyance of 
values and criticism inherent in the concept of education for citizenship (6.1). 
Education for citizenship will include socialization into the political culture of a 
society, through the conveyance of the values and the culture inherent in that society 
(6.2). This is important, as education for citizenship plays a role when it comes to 
nation building, especially in a multiethnic society like Mozambique. The creation of 
patriotism and a feeling of national identity and unity are essential, and through 
democratic participation by all, and through dialogue, the hope is that the conveyance 
of values will not represent a treat to the ideal of a dynamic and changing society. This 
is emphasized as education is also forwarded as a change agent, through the critical 
aspect of education for citizenship (6.3). In order to promote a viable democracy and 
avoid a situation of oppression of whatever kind, it is of outmost importance that 
education entails the critical aspect. My own view of education for citizenship, for the 
use of this thesis, and as a basis for later analysis in chapter 7, is finally outlined (6.4). 
By this I have a basis for further discussions concerning what role education for 
citizenship can play in Mozambique. 
6.1 Education and its relation to democracy 
Education is viewed by some as a means for increasing the competence of individuals, 
and thus contributing to reducing poverty and furthering development and growth. By 
learning necessary life-skills, a person can create herself/himself a living and in that 
way contribute to the development of the nation: “Inadequate education is one of the 
most powerful determinants of poverty (…)” (World Bank 2001:2). This mirrors an 
instrumental view on education as part of the economy, and this is of course an 
important part of education’s role in developing countries. But education can also be 
seen as a good in itself; contributing to the individual and personal development, and 
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providing autonomous citizens for a viable democracy. It is this view that is focused in 
the following. 
In every society, education has been important as a tool for socialization. Nyerere 
argues that this was also the case for the societies of pre-colonial Africa: 
The fact that pre-colonial Africa did not have “schools” - except for short 
periods of initiation in some tribes - did not mean that the children were not 
educated. They learned by living and doing. In the homes and on the farms 
they were taught the skills of the society, and the behaviour expected of its 
members (…). Through these means, and by the custom of sharing to which 
young people were taught to conform, the values of the society were 
transmitted. But this lack of formality did not mean that there was no 
education, nor did it affect its importance to the society (Nyerere 1968:45). 
Normally, it is the school’s task to convey the values and beliefs that characterize its 
society. The educationist Diane Ravitch gives an historical review of education’s role 
in society, and argues that there is a belief that education can shape people’s minds, 
and hence, society (Ravitch 2001:15). Education is created in concordance with the 
ideologies and beliefs of the politicians to form or maintain the society they want.  
But education can also contribute to creating an informed public that can protect its 
rights: “[T]he schools and their curriculum [were described] not as instruments of 
organized social control, but as mechanisms by which citizens could arm themselves 
with literacy and knowledge and defend themselves against the predictable incursions 
of a powerful government” (Ravitch 2001:17). Through education the citizens learn to 
think and reflect, and they exercise their intelligence in discussions. Their ability to 
participate in democratic activities will increase, and the democratic society will 
improve (Ravitch 2000:28). In this we see education’s double role: It should socialize 
its students into the existing values of society, and also create an informed, critical 
public through the creation of a critical consciousness. That's why education can be 
used as a means for both oppression and emancipation, as a tool for reproducing 
existing structures in society or as a tool for development and change in a democratic 
sense. This might seem contradictory, but it is at once possible to understand and agree 
with both16.  
 
16 When it comes to the problem of these aspects’ contradictory natures, this is of course an everlasting discussion as to the nature 
of education, and not to be discussed further within the framework of this thesis. 
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On this background, it becomes vital what kind of education is provided. The 
philosopher and social critic John Dewey emphasizes that any education will socialize 
its members, but he claims that education is also a social function; it varies according 
to the social group that it belongs to. The socialization that education brings about will 
vary in quality and value, depending on the aims of its society (Dewey 1916:94). For 
this reason, as long as the society is just and democratic; as long as dynamic growth 
and change is part of its aims rather than sustenance of the status quo; and as long as 
criticism and debate is also part of its culture; as long as it is political education that is 
the objective, there are no problems in the wish to convey the values and culture of that 
society.  A society that aims for democratic solutions will also imply a democratic 
education.  
Connected to this is the concept of political culture: “the political values, attitudes and 
behaviours of the general population” (Harber 2002:271), which is influenced by a 
society’s history, geography and its economic and social structure. The school, as a 
socialization agent, and a contributor to the creation of a population’s political culture, 
has a huge responsibility in this respect. The educationist Clive Harber argues that it is 
important to distinguish between political indoctrination, political socialization and 
political education. Political indoctrination is the kind one finds in totalitarian regimes, 
where one single ideology is held as the only true one. Political socialization is 
education based on some basic values and objectives that are not open for questioning, 
but where the nature and realization of the goals can be discussed. The latter, political 
education is education where all political values and goals are open for critical 
discussions and evaluations. This education functions as a change agent of the existing 
structures of society (Harber 2002:9). Democracy and education are intertwined and 
equally dependent on each other, and in this I see a conjunction of the two aspects of 
education that I have emphasized. These are also the two aspects of education that will 
be emphasized in this thesis, as education for citizenship. 
In the following, the roles that education for citizenship can play are further explored, 
as the conveyance of values and the critical aspect of education are outlined.  
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6.2 Conveying values 
Citizens of a democracy need to possess certain political values. Harber (2002:272-
273) claims that: “The skills and values of democracy are socially learned, they are not 
genetic. It is therefore important that African schools and education systems play a part 
in fostering the knowledge, skills and values necessary to promote and protect a 
democratic political culture”. He gives education an important role in the socialization 
of the citizens into common democratic values. It might sound paradoxical that one 
should convey values, and I emphasize that it is not of my intention to proclaim the 
view that it is possible to transfer or passively receive values, or any other knowledge 
for that matter, through education. With Dewey and Freire it is my belief that values 
must be internalized in the individual, as all learning takes place through an active 
process (Dewey 1916; Freire 2000). Dewey states it clearly as he claims that “The 
required beliefs cannot be hammered in; the needed attitudes cannot be plastered on” 
(Dewey 1916:13). Hence, as I use the term convey, this is not to be understood as a 
concrete transfer of values, but rather as a recognition of the responsibility that the 
governors have of contributing to a sense of unity and co-existence between people.  
That said; there are of course also vast disagreements as to which values to emphasize. 
Through the discussions above, however, I have emphasized that the reproductive and 
socializing aspect of education is present, but not necessarily in conflict to education’s 
role as a change agent. Nevertheless, this is an issue of difficult balancing. Diamond 
(1993) claims that values and the whole political culture of a nation often run out of 
the elite cultures. These elite cultures might be inclusive or exclusive, i.e. they can take 
mass culture into consideration or not, and contribute positively or negatively to 
democratization. It is important to keep in mind that within a country there will often 
be different ethnic and religious groups, with different values and beliefs. Thus, 
Diamond claims, a nation will always consist of different subcultures, and it can be 
difficult to talk about the political culture of a nation (Diamond 1993:5-8).  
The Mozambican society is indeed multi-ethnic, and people of different religions and 
cultures are to co-exist. There are many different ethnic groups in Mozambique; the 
North is dominated by the Makua; the Sena and Ndau are familiar in the Zambezi 
valley; and the Tsonga and Shangaan dominate in southern Mozambique. There are 
also other indigenous groups, and in addition, there are Europeans, Euro-Africans and 
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South Asians present in Mozambique. The variety of religions mirrors the multi-ethnic 
character of the Mozambican society as well: There are about 30% Christians and 17% 
Muslims in Mozambique, and 45% of the population have indigenous African and 
other beliefs (U.S. Department of State 2004). In this setting it is imaginable that a 
common basis of values can be difficult to find. 
The language situation plays part in this picture as well, as there are various indigenous 
languages in addition to Portuguese, which is the official language. Not only does this 
create problems of communication in a common language, but the language situation 
also has another important impact. Research shows that 
 (…) Portuguese, the language of privilege in Mozambique, was the parental 
tongue of almost 70% of UEM [Universidade Eduardo Mondlane] students, 
and the means of family communication for over 60%. This compares to a 
figure of 9% in the general population (Sawyerr showing to studies done by 
Mario et al., cited in Brock-Utne 2003:15). 
The mastery of Portuguese might become another dividing factor, creating different 
social classes in Mozambique, and thus contributing to further difficulties in the 
building of unity. However, to better understand the needs for and justification of 
education as a value conveyer, it is important to keep in mind that Mozambique is in 
the process of creating national unity and learning to co-exist after years of war and 
oppression. 
6.2.1 Common values for creation of identity and nation-states 
The political scientist Brendan Boyce argues that building identity and unity in a 
divided society is difficult. He discusses the situation in South-Africa, but I am of the 
opinion that his thoughts are also relevant in the context of Mozambique, considering 
the previous facts on the ethnicity of the country. Boyce (1999:236) claims that one 
needs to avoid both a balkanization with different ethnicities living and developing 
apart, and a universalism where all ethnicities are assimilated into an abstract 
nationhood, or maybe even into the culture of an elite. One should find the balance 
between particularism and universalism. Each ethnic group should perceive themselves 
as belonging to both their own group and also a nation of shared values (Boyce 
1999:236). Boyce argues that “national cohesion should centre on the idea of shared 
values and ideals” (Boyce 1999:237). But he emphasizes that it is a question of who is 
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to decide the values to be emphasized, and that nation building should not be an elite 
process -the participation by the masses is important. The policy of citizenship should 
imply the creation of a descriptive and critical vocabulary for the expression of the 
needs of each group in civil society. Identity is created in dialogue with others, in 
struggle with others, and individuals and groups play an important role in the nation 
building debate. The dialogue between the different groups enables the sharing of new 
and ever evolving common values and universal principles. Boyce argues that this 
creates an opportunity to avoid both universalism and particularism, and rather create a 
“new, ever evolving hybrid culture” (Boyce 1999:241). Dewey also puts emphasis on 
dialogue and contact between groups as a means of creating a common basis of values: 
“In order to have a large number of values in common, all the members of the group 
must have an equable opportunity to receive and to take from others. There must be a 
large variety of shared undertakings and experiences” (Dewey 1916:97-98). 
In agreement with Boyce and Dewey, I am of the opinion that despite how difficult the 
agreement of a common value basis might seem, this is nevertheless an inevitable and 
important basis for co-existence in a society. My definition of democracy can be 
helpful in the process, as participation by all on an equal basis, through deliberative 
dialogue, can be a tool for this creation. It is not my intention to come forward with 
any concrete values that I view as the correct ones to emphasize. This is the task of 
democracy; that with time society should reach agreements concerning its aims and 
common values. Inherent in the democratic nature is the safety that these values and 
principles are never statically decided, but can be revised through people’s critical 
participation. In the following, therefore, I turn to another aspect of education for 
citizenship; the importance of critical consciousness. 
6.3 Paulo Freire’s contribution; the critical aspect 
Education’s role as a change agent is connected to its critical aspect; its creation of a 
critical consciousness. Freire’s writings, such as “Pedagogy of the oppressed” have had 
major importance, especially on the area of education and development in the third 
world. His project was connected to adult education and alphabetization as a way out 
of oppression: “To speak the true word is to transform the world” (Freire 2000: 87-88). 
The oppressed should learn to see their own situation through critical education 
springing out of their own local context.  Freire’s writings are contextually bound to 
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the special conditions of his time and background, and when he uses the term 
“oppressed” it might seem drastic applied to our context. But oppression might take 
many forms; it is not necessarily a relationship between a personalized oppressor and 
the powerless, the oppressed. Freire’s program gives education an important role in the 
development of a society: “The special contribution of the educator to the birth of the 
new society would have to be a critical education which could help to form critical 
attitudes (…)” (Freire 1974:32). Critical education produces a basic condition for 
democratization. It enables the people to discuss problems of their context and 
participate critically.  
6.3.1  Fear of freedom and culture of silence 
Freire holds that in the state of oppression, the oppressed have internalized the 
consciousness of the oppressors. They cannot see the oppressors as outside of 
themselves, but rather identify with them, and can therefore not engage in the struggle 
to overcome this adhesion. The identification with the oppressor leads to the fear of 
freedom, as Freire calls it: “The oppressed, having internalized the image of the 
oppressor and adopted his guidelines, are fearful of freedom. Freedom would require 
them to eject this image and replace it with autonomy and responsibility” (Freire 
2000:47). The fear of freedom grows in a society characterized by a culture of silence. 
The oppressors silence the oppressed by making them internalize negative self-images. 
The oppressed are not capable of responding to the culture enforced on them, but 
remain in a situation where they believe that they have no voice, that they are not in 
control, but merely have to accept whatever happens to them as beyond their power of 
influence. They are incapable of taking responsibility and remain with their fear of 
freedom (Freire 2000). One might view this as characteristics of any society marked by 
any kind of oppression. Hence, one might as well see this in connection to the Western 
society and the apathy described by Pateman in chapter 5. Our own situation might be 
characterized by an apathy based on the feeling of lost control of one’s life and 
surroundings caused by the distance to decision power, or even globalization.  
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6.3.2 Conscientização; the transition to critical consciousness 
“Conscientização” (Freire 2000:35) is a central aspect in Freire’s philosophy. This is 
the process people go through when developing critical consciousness. Freire holds 
that the oppressed hold a state of “semi-intransitive consciousness” (Freire 1974:17). 
They cannot apprehend problems outside their sphere of biological necessity; they are 
concerned about survival only. But as the oppressed go into a stage where they are able 
to understand and react on their context, they become “transitive” (Freire 1974:17). 
They become engaged in their existence, in the dialogue between people and the 
world. There is however, an initial stage before this one, and Freire calls this the 
“naïve transitivity” (Freire 1974:18). This stage is characterized by an over-
simplification of problems, by nostalgia for the past, by not being critical, and by 
magical explanations. This consciousness might result in fanaticism, if it is not led into 
critical transitive consciousness. Freire explains the stage of critical transition by its 
depth in the interpretation of problems, that one is willing to test and revise one’s 
findings and to accept (only) what is valid. As people understand and grasp the 
causality of things, their understanding of reality becomes critical (Freire 1974:18). 
Through Freire’s pedagogy of the oppressed the hope is that people will develop 
critical consciousness and be able to understand and transform their reality.  
For a society like Mozambique, lacking democratic experience, this is a precondition 
for democratization. A society that is not trained in dialogue, participation, political 
and social responsibility, as well as political and social solidarity, the conditions are 
not satisfying for establishing a democratic regime. Hence, Freire questions the 
importation of democracy. It cannot be superimposed from one society to another; the 
context needs to be taken into consideration. Freire outlines the situation in Brazil: 
And so we imported the structure of the national democratic state without first 
considering our own context, unaware that the inauthenticity of superimposed 
solutions dooms them to failure. Not only did we lack experience in self-
government when we imported the democratic state; more importantly, we 
were not yet able to offer the people either the circumstances or the climate 
for their first experiments in democracy (Freire 1974:28). 
In a closed society, the preconditions for participatory behaviour are not present; the 
people are not trained for democratic participation. Democracy is a form of life, Freire 
claims, characterized by critical consciousness (Freire 1974:29). 
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6.3.3 Criticism of Freire’s objective, recognition of his methods 
Freire has been widely criticized for his revolutionary visions, which appears to have 
correct answers of what should be the outcomes. And even worse, these correct 
answers are to be brought to the masses, which need education to see them. 
Consequently, Freire can be said to contradict himself, and much of his philosophy can 
be said to appear meaningless (Harber 1997:37). Harber is of the opinion that Freire 
nevertheless has made an impact on the understanding of the political nature of 
education and the urge for critical education, and he argues that this thinking is 
transferred to today’s thoughts on political culture and democratic education. But this 
tradition does not consider the wanted outcomes of such an education; the aim is not 
“to educate conservatives or socialists but rather that people should decide their 
political opinions for themselves on the basis of informed judgement” (Harber 
1997:37). The emphasis is on a political education that nurtures critical thinking and 
awareness of political phenomena, by educational methods that consider a variety of 
opinions and facts through discussions and exploration (Harber 1997).  
Additionally, it is appropriate to ask whether a fundament of criticism, such as it is 
prescribed by Freire, is a justified demand of the developing countries: Especially as 
one might question whether this fundament really exists, even in the West. We have a 
political culture where freedom of speech, debates and hence, criticism are important 
cornerstones. But would criticism that fundamentally questions and seizes to break 
down our way of living be accepted, or are the debates in our society limited to the 
paradigm within which we live? It becomes notable that Freire’s philosophy is quite 
revolutionary, in the sense that he wants a total change of society and the set structures 
it entails, and this is maybe too much to ask. It is, however, no doubt that his thoughts 
about the transition into critical consciousness are important in the context of 
democratization in Mozambique. 
6.4 Summary; education for citizenship – my view 
In this chapter I have discussed the role of education as both a socializing- and change 
agent. Education’s close relationship to democracy and the values inherent in a 
democratic society diminish the controversy between education’s role as a conveyer of 
values and its role in emphasizing the critical aspect. Both these aspects of education 
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will be important in an education for citizenship, and they play a vital role in a 
democracy. I am nevertheless not arguing that education for citizenship should 
necessarily be implemented as a special subject in school. It can also be taken care of 
by other means, for instance through other subjects in school. Mozambique has chosen 
to provide its citizens with education for citizenship both as an integrated subject in the 
early stages of primary school, and later as a subject on its own (chapter 3). 
Throughout the theoretical outline I have argued that education for citizenship plays a 
vital role in the process of democratization in Mozambique, and that there is a present 
need for this kind of education. It can contribute to diminish the lack of democratic 
experience sustained through the era of colonization and the period of one-party 
regime. It can give the Mozambican people the tool they need to become genuine 
participants on the democratic arena of their country, and to understand and control the 
impact that the development aid partners have on the development of Mozambique. I 
view education for citizenship as all education that contributes to people’s ability to 
participate in a democratic society, and as I see it, this is what Harber calls political- 
or democratic education. I also recon Freire’s pedagogy of the oppressed as a good 
example of education for citizenship, even though one might question to what degree 
one might demand criticism as part of the political culture. What is important is that 
the education that is provided for citizenship focuses on common values necessary to 
build a good society where all can co-exist, and also that it emphasizes critical 
consciousness for the participation in democracy and further evaluation of these 
values. 
In the following chapter I will outline the analysis of my empirical data, and conclude 
the discussions of my research questions. This ends in an analysis of which role 
education for citizenship actually does play in Mozambique, according to my 
informants. 
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7. DATA DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS  
In this chapter the investigation of my research questions are concluded. In chapter 3 I 
concluded that Mozambique was a nation lacking democratic experience. Hence, I start 
out by focusing on my respondents’ thoughts concerning the Mozambican society and 
the obstacles that one might find for democratization, to address my first research 
question: What characterizes the present Mozambican democracy and the transition it 
goes through? (7.1). In chapter 4 I concluded that the aid relationship has inherent 
dilemmas, that the partnership is not functioning genuinely as one as its intentions are 
not fulfilled. I therefore go on to focus on my informants’ view on the aid relationship 
and what impact this has on the democratization process, to concentrate on my second 
research question: What characterizes the development aid partnership in this context? 
(7.2). These discussions provide a basis for the exploration of my last research 
question, as they suggest that education is needed in the Mozambican situation. In 
chapter 6 I argued that education can play two important roles in a democracy; as a 
conveyer of values for co-existence and also as a contributor of the critical aspect for 
participation in a democracy. I thus close this chapter by exploring my informants’ 
view on this matter to investigate the main research question of this thesis: Which role 
does education for citizenship play in the Mozambican context? (7.3).  
My empirical findings are analyzed in the light of the theoretical discussions 
undertaken in the previous chapters, and the theoretical findings are compared with my 
empirical findings from Mozambique. Throughout this whole chapter I make extensive 
use of citations from my interviews, as I find it important that my informants stand out 
in the text. This is both due to ethical and methodological considerations, as the 
citations express reality to a greater degree than my own interpretations. 
7.1 Obstacles for the Mozambican democracy  
In the theoretical outline, I concluded that Mozambique was a nation with a lack of 
democratic experience. This will be explored further through the following outline of 
my informants’ view on different obstacles for the Mozambican democracy. When 
asking my respondents to characterize the present Mozambican democracy, I often got 
the answer that this was an ongoing process. They emphasized that the process is 
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steadily improving, and as one of my respondents put it, it is now “gaining roots”. But 
they also were clear about the fact that there are still many issues to solve before 
Mozambique can be said to have reached a satisfying level of democracy. 
7.1.1 (Mis-) understandings of the term democracy 
One of the things that were pointed to by my informants was the fact that many 
Mozambicans do not know what a democracy is. This could be seen in connection to 
my outline of the Mozambican people as a people without any democratic experience. 
Freire (1974) argues that such societies can be characterized by a naïve- or semi-
intransitive consciousness that hampers action for change. He calls such a society a 
closed society, not ready to simply imitate a way of government that they have no 
qualifications to handle. In this setting, it is no wonder that many of my informants call 
attention to the need of improving the average Mozambican’s knowledge of the issue. 
One of my informants emphasized that the problem of ignorance in connection to the 
concept of democracy was not just a problem for the uneducated Mozambicans, but an 
issue that had to be dealt with on all levels of the Mozambican society: 
Now, the question in Mozambique is not only to teach all the kids in primary 
education this concept of democracy. Even people like me, I mean, all the 
people need also to get the message, to learn what we mean by democracy. So 
this is not an agenda only for primary education, but for everyone!  
(Representative for the ministry). 
Quite a few of my informants argued that some people had the impression that a 
democratic society is a society without rules, where everyone can do as one pleases. I 
have argued that traditional beliefs might have influenced the African concept of 
democracy. And the cultural issue was also a concern to some of my respondents: 
We need the democracy, but maybe not in the way it is applied. Because that 
we now that in our communities, (…) in a patriarchal community, the men is 
who has got the voice, so how can you say that everyone can vote, can take 
decisions for their lives (…). [H]ere the constitution say that we are equal to 
the law. But when we go down to our practices, to our culture, you find 
sometimes that it is not just like that. And also there are some places in 
Mozambique, where who has got the voice is the women, in a matriarchal 
society. So, these are different settings that we have to have in mind when we 
are applying this concept of democracy.  
(Representative for civil society) 
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One of my informants from civil society claimed that investigations show that people 
prefer using the old systems in society. Instead of using the formal juridical system, 
they go to the traditional ones; the régulos or chiefs that were traditionally appointed 
by the colonial masters, and this is obviously undermining the formal democratization 
of the country. Therefore, cultural differences become a problem in connection to the 
transfer of a Western-type democracy. As emphasized in chapter 5, power is 
traditionally concentrated with a “chief”, it is a personalized rule, and this makes a 
democratic system with elections on different levels somewhat difficult to perceive:   
(…) [T]he people was questioning last year even the municipality elections we 
had. They said: “What is this about? We have already elected the head of 
state, so who is the boss? Is it Chissano17 or the major of a town like 
Maputo?” That is extremely important, because in Africa our concept of 
power is that power is concentrated in someone very important; the king. That 
is our concept of democracy.  
(Representative for the ministry). 
Power is legitimized through the person it is associated with, in concordance with the 
traditional belief in authority. Another of my informants claimed that people believe 
that they have to be eternally grateful to the person in power, and that one has no right 
to be disrespectful; that is, to elect someone new. This could be connected to the fact 
that the Frelimo-politicians in power are the very same as the heroes from the 
liberation struggle. But it also has cultural bearings: 
What I see happen very often (…), is that changing the leaderships, becomes a 
very big challenge. That’s where the democracy is not very well developed. 
And I think, partly that has a cultural bearing, that in most of our traditional 
thinking, the older someone is, the wiser that person is. We have tribes like my 
own, where the head of the village gets born from the chiefs. (…) Now those 
tribes have to conform to the modern democracy. And we are still struggling 
with that. If a political party was formed by so and so, 20 years ago, we have 
to keep that person regardless of if he is achieving the objectives or not. 
That’s where we have a problem, that’s where I think our own cultural 
thinking is influencing what is seen to be the modern type of democracy.  
(Representative for the World Bank18). 
 
17 The President of Mozambique at the time. 
18 This informant was an African working within the donor community, and through some of her/his statements her/his 
identification as an African seems to be more evident than the identification as a worker in the donor community. This will also be 
notable in some of her/his statements later on. 
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From the democracy-theory discussions earlier, it seems like this is an understanding 
of democracy that is in coherence with an elite democracy, or oligarchy. In chapter 3 I 
argued that this elite thinking is also recognizable in the organization of Frelimo, 
which turned into an elitist party. The process of repatrimonialisation and 
centralization of power, making the democratic system even harder to maintain, is a 
continuation of this development, as I see it. This stands in contrast to the competitive 
democracy where the elections decide who gains power. The emphasis on age and 
respect for the elders might be a cultural bearing that makes it difficult to apprehend 
that every 18-year-old should be able to participate in the elections of the leaders. This 
creates a dilemma of how far one should go in the adjustment to the local context. Not 
all local beliefs and practices will be in concordance with the democratic ideal.  
Another cause for confusion concerning the term democracy, and the present 
difficulties in adjusting to a multi-party democracy, appears to be people’s experience 
with the one-party regime: 
Before, we had one party only. We are living now in a new situation (…). If 
the people don’t know what democracy is, how are they supposed to 
participate in democracy? (…) [W]hen we had only one party in Mozambique, 
the people thought it was democracy. Now we have many parties; what is the 
difference?  
(Representative for civil society). 
 This can be seen as a continuation of a conception of power as something that is 
statically placed within the reach of a limited number of persons. Frelimo came to 
power and introduced a one-party regime that lasted for 15 years in Mozambique, and I 
have claimed that it is questionable to what extent these regimes can be said to have 
been democratic. It seems to me as if this has contributed to a continuation of the lack 
of democratic experience in the Mozambican society, and it stands as an obstacle to 
further democratization.  
7.1.2 Undemocratic practices; propaganda and corruption 
One of my informants argued that the democracy in Mozambique was at a good state:  
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The democracy in Mozambique today is good, because it is a process in the 
democratic society, and what is needed to bring this process forward, is 
respected. It is respected in the way that it exist bodies that symbolize the 
democratic play, as for example the political parties, civic organizations and 
public and private media. This means there is room for everybody to 
participate, and above all, the main thing is that there is liberty of speech, 
liberty of press. (…) Each citizen has a means of participation, of being an 
active citizen, participating in organizations and so forth.  
(Representative for civil society) 
 
Most of my other informants, however, uttered a concern for the discrepancy between 
the expressed democratic ideal, and the actual practices in the Mozambican society. I 
am of the opinion that this functions as another obstacle to the democratization process 
in Mozambique. One of my informants from civil society put it as simply as the fact 
that the people in power, the government, are not in need for any change, it is a better 
situation for them that  things remain as they are. Others considered the campaigns 
connected to elections: 
(…) [W]hen you see the campaign manifests of the different political parties, 
very few have real issues to offer, but rather personalities, conflicts and 
historical aspects, which have nothing, really, to do with making me and other 
citizens think that this party will serve me best. So that has to change, and that 
will take generations.  
(Representative for the World Bank). 
As I see it, this way of campaigning is not mirroring a high level of democratic 
practice, but is rather inherent in what Braathen (2003) calls destabilization of politics. 
The fact that many of the persons in government are former war-heroes, “antigo 
combatantes” from the liberating forces of Frelimo, is used in a persuasive manner to 
convince people to elect them, and as I have argued earlier, people’s feelings of 
gratefulness and obligation prevent them from taking part in a genuine democracy. The 
fact that Renamo used to be the enemy, the terrorists, in the civil war, makes the 
political play between the two major political parties a difficult matter. One of my 
respondents even argued that the persuasion starts already with the school child: 
You see that public instruments are used to favor a particular party. You go 
into a classroom, and find that, ok, it’s good to have a picture of the president, 
but what does that mean? It means that these kids will grow up, thinking that 
he or she is the eternal president of this country, you know? (…) 
(Representative for the World Bank). 
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This citation reflects a situation where one might suspect that propaganda is used as a 
political tool, and the reminder about the difference between political education and 
political indoctrination becomes evident. To me, both the fact that these kinds of 
political messages occur, and that they are tolerated, are symptoms of a society without 
democratic experience, and maybe even a society characterized by a culture of silence. 
One of my informants from civil society does however tell me a story contrary to this 
impression: 
During the campaigns prior to the elections a police commandant in one area 
said that it was not allowed to put up posters and slogans for political parties. 
One party put up their slogans anyway, but the other did not, to obey the law. 
The next day people violated against it. From the two political parties one had 
problems because it did not get to inform its electors. Really, the police was 
not allowed to do this.  
(Representative for civil society).  
There exist, of course, politically active and informed people in Mozambique as 
anywhere else. Nevertheless, to me it seemed like people, to some extent, accepted 
undemocratic practices that surround them, maybe because it is part of a culture of 
silence; they see them as outside their own control. In such a setting, there is room for 
political practices that would probably not be accepted in other societies.  
Corruption is a big issue in Mozambique, and hence, it was also brought up during 
many of my interviews, especially in connection to the Swedish audit report that was 
constantly mentioned in the newspapers at the time: 
It is not, I mean, totally unusual to show receipts, when it is many donors, to 
show to the same activity, same receipt. That is not only in Mozambique, but 
also elsewhere. One can take advantage of it when there are many donors, 
when one has the bilateral.  
(Representative for the donor community) 
This informant put basket funding forward as a possible remedy: 
It is possible that these problems will appear in the new basket fund also, but 
then the advantage is that there is maybe 8 or 9 donors, so there is more 
pressure on the government, but also more difficult to abuse money, when one 
doesn’t have that many projects. It will be easier to have control. 
(Representative for the donor community) 
Even though this informant claimed that some ministers have personal interests in the 
continuation of different projects, and that the ministry therefore is mixed in its 
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commitment to the new aid approach, (s)he believed strongly in the SWAp. It seemed 
like (s)he saw this as a way of increasing the donors’ control of the government. In this 
setting, my informant pointed to the importance of a critical civil society: 
 (…) [Corruption] could make one think that it is important with 
complimenting support; (…) it can be capacity building, or support to the civil 
society, to have a more watch-dog function, so that one has national pressure 
on the government.  
(Representative for the donor community). 
Theory outlined in chapter 3 has shown that democratization can be put forward as a 
remedy for corruption, as a critical opposition is part of a genuine democratic society. 
Hence, funding civil society and creating a critical opposition in a democratic 
environment becomes important in the fight against corruption.  
7.1.3 Limited participation 
An important measure of the degree to which a society is democratic, is whether the 
civil society and ordinary people can be said to participate in it, or not. Mass culture 
and participation by all is vital to a viable democracy. The discussions on democracy 
and my definition of democracy in chapter 5 also emphasize participation. In 
Mozambique, however, it looks as if this is not yet working sufficiently. During the 
talks with my respondents we discussed participation in general, but mainly in 
connection to the policy planning within the SWAp: 
It’s a process. We haven’t reached the point where we are happy with our own 
government within the issue. We are still in a starting stage, because it is not 
long ago that Mozambican civil society started to get involved in the 
discussions on the educational policy. I think, long time ago this was ministry 
issues, ok? But from some years ago, Mozambican civil society has been 
trying to be part of it. 
(Representative for civil society). 
The government representatives were often more reluctant to agree that the 
participation of civil society was not satisfactory. They emphasized that this was a 
process; that they were improving, but that one could never say that the level of 
participation was good enough. But on a direct question from me whether the 
participation of civil society was sufficient, a government representative answered: 
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If you hadn’t used the word sufficiently, I would have said yes, but then you 
say sufficiently, I say no.  
(Representative for the ministry). 
It seemed to me that there were still disagreements between the different stakeholders 
in connection to the decision on what form this participation should have, and I got the 
impression that the government representatives were opposed to views held by most of 
my other informants. But one of my informants from civil society also expressed 
understanding for the government’s role, and emphasized that civil society was not 
supposed to have decision power:  
I think there are different things that the civil society and the NGOs suggested 
that was not sufficiently incorporated. I remember that we paid lots of 
attention to the issue of pre-school teaching. And I think this is important. But 
when you have 40% of the children at school age, still not in the schools, who 
are we to say that the government has to emphasize pre-school education? We 
cannot decide! I can only pressure, to make them do it. But, my capacity to 
decide, it is not mine. The civil society is to see, analyze, criticize, suggest, 
search, push, but not to decide.   
(Representative for civil society) 
This informant was coming from an NGO participating to a great extent in the 
processes within the education sector, and cooperating strongly with the ministry.   
Many of my informants from civil society argued that they only had impact on the 
implementation side, and that they had no influence when decisions were to be made. 
An informant from the donor community expressed the concern that the inclusion of 
civil society was not in concordance with expectations and intentions: 
I think the government is willing to work with NGOs. The question is how. 
(…)[T]he donors, not only are we saying; government, you have to work with 
NGOs, we are also saying, in our own donor meetings, how are we working 
with NGOs? And, an interesting phenomenon has just come up; (…) we had a 
report a few weeks ago in one of our donor meetings, which said that the 
representatives that we appointed are no longer coming. This means that the 
incentives that would encourage the NGOs for participation maybe may have 
been misunderstood. Maybe their expectations are different. So, even if you 
invite them, if they don’t see the meaningfulness of spending their time there, 
then they would just avoid that if they are not coming. So to me, that is where 
we have to deal with the situation. That is a challenge, for both the donors and 
the government.  
(Representative for the World Bank). 
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It could be serious if representatives from civil society start to withdraw from the 
process, because they feel their presence is not worthwhile. Nevertheless, my 
informants often emphasized that it was better now, than before. An important 
question is however; what do the different stakeholders understand by participation? 
For what purpose do they speak of participation?  
 How can we approach what the government perception of participation is, 
and what we think as a civil society? (…) Of course donors are also trying to 
make sure that this participation is actually for participation, trying to push 
the government to allow more civil society participation (…).  
(Representative for civil society). 
It seems timely to ask if the focus on participation is only rhetoric that the government 
has adopted, or if it mirrors a genuine understanding of the importance of 
participation? Participation is a milestone for democracy, and it is vital that 
participation from civil society is established with this objective in mind, and not just 
to please the donor community by adapting their prescribed remedies. For now, it 
appears that the limited participation by civil society stands as an obstacle for 
democracy. 
7.1.4 Language and democracy 
Also the language issue creates problems for the participation in, and implementation 
of, democracy in Mozambique. It seems obvious that a situation, in which a great 
amount of people do not understand public information, will have a negative impact on 
the democratic practice in a society. If the political culture in a society is to promote 
democracy, it depends on the degree of participation of its members. I have 
emphasized the importance of creating a critical atmosphere, through the participation 
of all. Social change and a viable democracy depend on this. But participation becomes 
difficult as the public debate is conducted in a language a lot of people do not 
understand. A few of my informants did not see the language issue as a problem, but 
this was opposite to most of the others: 
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We have problems with the fact that there is no way in articulating in one 
language, and be understood by all Mozambicans. When the head of the state 
goes to the parliament to address the information state of the nation, he is only 
understood by 25% of the population. The other people say: “Ok, the 
president is talking, but what is he talking about?” And they cannot 
understand, because Portuguese is completely strange.  
(Representative for the ministry). 
When in addition I have drawn attention to the fact that the mastery of the Portuguese 
language is increasingly becoming a factor for division of social classes in 
Mozambique, this is indeed a negative development for the democracy of the country 
and a decrease in the opportunity for participation by all on an equal basis.  
At the same time one informant from civil society argued that this was no problem, 
that most people spoke Portuguese, and that they were no also implementing local 
languages at school. Another informant from civil society emphasized that 
colonization is an inevitable historical fact, and that Portuguese is now important as a 
lingua franca for the development of Mozambique. The Mozambican democracy needs 
a common language for communication, for dialogue and debates, and Portuguese 
might be the best choice among many bad alternatives. 
7.1.5 Poverty  
Another obstacle for the implementation of democracy in Mozambique, frequently 
mentioned by my respondents, was the lack of available resources. I discussed this 
issue in chapter 5, how the economic situation in Africa interfered in the process of 
democratization, and how important it is to bring the problem of poverty reduction into 
the democratization process. One of my informants claimed that the lack of resources 
and the degree of poverty might influence the concept that people have of democracy: 
(…) I see a correlation between poverty, the level of illiteracy, which is very 
pronounced in Mozambique, and the way that we understand democracy. Our 
effort should actually be in the sense of fighting against poverty, by 
prioritizing education. Because with educated people, I think Mozambique will 
be able to increase our economic growth, and therefore will improve our 
concept of democracy. But, in the current situation it will be extremely 
difficult, I think.  
(Representative for the ministry).  
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My informant seems to think that fighting poverty and increasing economic growth 
would contribute to improving the Mozambicans’ concept of democracy. It seems 
doubtful that improved living-conditions would automatically imply that people would 
get a better concept of democracy. But my informant also emphasized education in this 
picture. I would think that education is vital for people’s understanding of democracy; 
both through the role that education plays in enlightening people, through the 
conveyance of values and the creation of a critical consciousness, and maybe also as an 
agent for economic growth. Another interpretation of this citation might be the impact 
that poverty has on the self-confidence of people. People’s belief in themselves as a 
democratic self-governing body is not nourished in a state of constant poverty. 
Participation is connected to self-confidence, as I see it, and it might be essential to 
solve the socio-political issues before people can believe in their own abilities to rule. 
This can be seen in connection to thoughts of Freire (2000) about the fear of freedom; 
the oppressed’s internalization of a negative self-image, making them believe in it, and 
becoming incapable of self-government. 
There are also other impacts of poverty connected to democratization. My informants 
emphasized that it was often not possible to choose the best, or most “correct”, 
democratic solution, because the resources are not there to fulfil the requirements: 
 (…) [S]ometimes from the outside, they would like to see problems solved 
similarly as what they do in Europe and so on. And in those cases, we have 
problems. (…)[I]f someone comes and (…) speaks about right to education, 
but we have no place to let all children go to school. He speaks about right to 
have food, treatment in our hospitals, but we have not enough space and 
human resources in the health field to meet that need. (…) It means that in the 
field of poverty, it is quite difficult to talk about democracy.  
(Representative for a governmental institution). 
I have stressed that Mozambique is no exception to the problem of poverty. There are 
simply neither enough resources to organize things in the most democratic manner, nor 
to uncover the best solution at all times. This also includes the resources needed to 
carry out the elections, possibly the most emphasized institution of democracy, and I 
return to this in the following.  
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7.1.6 The pure transfer of democracy 
When I talked to my respondents about democratization, it was repeatedly argued that 
when it comes to the issue of democracy, the influence from the West was a difficult 
matter, and the elections were frequently mentioned in connection to this. They were 
described as very resource demanding, which was particularly problematic, 
considering the Mozambicans’ seemingly lacking ability to make use of the elections 
for democratic means: 
 (…) [Y]ou know, the way you see democracy is totally different from the way 
I see democracy.  (…)For instance in the understanding of the North people, 
you think that one of the evidences of democracy is that countries are 
supposed to organize elections from time to time, and that is the  expression of 
democracy. Ok; and we are doing so. Somehow suggested by partner 
countries and so on, it seems now to be a global culture. But how genuine 
really is the democracy in Mozambique, if each time Mozambique prepare to 
have elections, we have to approach donor countries, for them to found the 
process? (…) How will you really be able to take your own decisions if the 
money is coming from outside?   
(Representative for the ministry). 
The competitive democracy with multi-party elections seems to play a limited role in 
the Mozambicans’ present understanding of democracy. But there were also those who 
spoke in favour of the introduction of the Western-type democracy, at least over time: 
I think we still have a long way to go. But I think the ultimate goal is the 
Western type of democracy, because it has been tested over years, and it 
would be the ideal if we were to attain close at that. Countries that have tried 
to do that, have tended to be much more peaceful, and have developed even 
economically much faster.  
(Representative for the World Bank).  
This is, however, a view that differs fundamentally from the rest of my informants’. I 
got an overall impression that there is a need for new thinking concerning the 
implementation of democracy, and that there are problems with a pure transfer of a 
Western-type democracy: 
I am of the opinion [that Mozambique might need another kind of democracy]. 
(…) I would say it is not different from what is happening everywhere in 
Africa. You have a democracy that is being copied, and that is not functioning 
very well. I would say that if we could have the opportunity to look at the 
democracy that we have, and how it relates to how our people perceive this 
democracy, then it would be better.  
(Representative for Unesco). 
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The similarity to the description of Freire (1974) of the pure adaptation of democracy 
in Brazil is striking. The democratization of Mozambique needs to be actively 
internalized by the Mozambican citizens. As long as they have no experience with 
democratic participation, a pure transfer of democracy does not seem viable.  
This also means that the democratization needs to take the African context into 
account; the history and culture of the country, people’s traditional values and beliefs: 
I think we have to define democracy adapted to different realities and cultures. 
Because there is something that one can say for instance in the North, that this 
is democracy, and this is the way things should be. But maybe you don’t apply 
that theory blindly in a country like Mozambique, or Malawi, wherever. 
Because there are differences in the way things work, in the way people think. 
So you have to take the concept, yes, but you have to say: “Now we have got 
the common understanding, but how do we apply this? How do each person, 
or we as a country in Africa, apply this issue of democracy?” Because of 
course, every person wants to be in a democratic country, everybody wants to 
have the right to say and do what they think they should do.  But we have to 
have the caution, not to force things from other places.  
(Representative for civil society). 
The theoretical outline has shown that democracy might take many forms and that a 
contextual understanding of the term is possible and should be encouraged. Even 
though I have warned against an undemocratic rule by norms, a Mozambican 
democracy should be consciously created according to the Mozambican reality and the 
needs of the ordinary Mozambicans. It seems to me that this is not yet the case in the 
process of democratization in Mozambique.  
The core of the issue is that the Western-type democracy is often encouraged by the 
external partners: 
I think that this democracy we are implementing is not our democracy, as 
Africans, it is not. But at some time I understand that there is no way for 
Africa to keep our concept of democracy if Africa is so dependent of the West. 
And you know that some rules behind the aid have to do with the principle of 
democracy, good governance and so on. So, we have to adjust to the situation. 
If who is bringing the food when you are in crisis, because of the floods or 
because of the draught, is the North, if who is bringing the money for you to 
organize elections, if who is bringing the money for you to organize your 
health, education, roads and so on and so forth, is the North, you have to 
adjust your concept of democracy to the concept of who bring the money for 
you. So this is the only reason for me, why we have to open the door and to 
accept this situation. 
(Representative for the ministry). 
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The quote illustrates the problem of aid dependency and conditionality connected to 
aid, and another of my informants expresses the inevitable, natural link between aid 
and conditionality: 
Again, we have a process that takes time, but we cannot avoid this West 
democracy, we cannot avoid it because we have no money (…). Objectively, if 
you give money to support me to some extent, you will also influence me, and 
my life!  
(Representative for a governmental institution).  
The problem of conditionality is extensively addressed later. Sufficient to say here is 
that democratization is not just encouraged, but often posed as conditionality. 
Apparently, this is in itself perceived as quite undemocratic, and I question whether to 
introduce a forced democracy will have the desired developmental effect. Aid is given 
to promote development, and as Linde (2000) has argued, the donors have an agenda 
and purposes for the money they are providing. Corruption has been outlined as a 
serious problem in Mozambique, and hence, it is understandable and necessary that 
actions are taken to secure that the money is used for its intended purposes. It is 
nevertheless important to keep in mind that there are different views of what the good 
purposes are, and how to fulfil them. No matter how good one’s intentions, it is 
imperative to take into consideration that others might view things totally different. If 
not, there is that danger, that the pure transfer of a Western-type democracy will 
become an obstacle to the democratization of Mozambique. 
7.1.7 What characterizes the present Mozambican democracy and 
the transition it goes through? 
In the preceding I have addressed the first of my research questions for this thesis: 
What characterizes the present Mozambican democracy and the transition it goes 
through? In my empirical data the tendency is that the present Mozambican democracy 
is characterized by a process that is steadily improving, but nevertheless with great 
obstacles. Obstacles that were mentioned by my informants are for instance people’s 
misunderstandings of the term democracy, often based in cultural differences from the 
Western democratic ideal and the lack of democratic experience throughout the history 
of Mozambique. This implies that the balancing of an adjustment to the local context 
as well as an emphasis on the democratic ideal and human rights might become 
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difficult. Even though one of my informants from civil society argued that the 
democracy in Mozambique was in a good state, as democratic bodies were established 
and people had the opportunity to participate, this was not the impression I got from 
my other informants. Quite the opposite, there was a tendency that undemocratic 
practices like propaganda and corruption were pointed to as evident in the 
Mozambican society, functioning as obstacles to democratization. Another tendency in 
my material is that the limited participation of civil society characterizes the 
Mozambican society today, and functions as an obstacle for further democratization. 
This was nevertheless seen as an improving process, and one informant from civil 
society expressed understanding with the government’s situation. Even though one of 
my informants did not see it in that way, I got an impression that the language issue 
illustrates the fragmentation of the Mozambican society. At the same time it could 
entail a problem for the transition into democracy, as information is difficult to convey 
to all in an understandable manner. There was a clear tendency that poverty was 
pointed to as an obstacle for the possibility to choose the best available solutions, and 
it could also stand as a reason for a lacking self-confidence within the Mozambican 
people when it comes to the ability to be self-governing.  
Finally, the transition into democracy has been characterized as a pure transfer of the 
Western type democracy, maintained through the conditionalities tied to aid from the 
West. One of my informants claimed that the “Western solution” is the best option, but 
the tendency in my material shows that there is a need for adjustment to the local 
context. From my informants’ statements, I got the impression that such a pure transfer 
of democracy is not viable, and will function as another obstacle to the 
democratization of Mozambique. This is also in concordance with the earlier 
theoretical outline. 
As I see it, all these obstacles to democratization are very much caused by the lack of 
democratic experience in Mozambique, sustained by a history of colonization and an 
authoritarian regime. There is a need to replace this lack of democratic experience, and 
I am of the opinion that education for citizenship can play a contributory role in this 
respect.  
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In the following, I go on to explore the Mozambican context, and the setting for a 
Mozambican education for citizenship, as I focus on my next research question: What 
characterizes the development aid partnership in this context?  
7.2 Development aid partnership; for better or worse? 
The development aid partners constitute an important part of the development of 
Mozambique, and the introduction of the Sector Wide Approach (SWAp) has been an 
important happening on the aid agenda the recent years. In my theoretic outline I have 
argued that there are still important dilemmas concerning the development aid 
partnership. The focus on democratization is not unproblematic, as the level of local 
ownership might be questioned within a partnership that is not functioning according 
to its intentions. It is a vital question how this aid relationship functions in connection 
to the democratization of Mozambique. In the following this is clarified, as I 
empirically investigate my second research question. 
7.2.1 Partnership  
Even though, as I have argued in the foregoing, the participation of civil society might 
not have been satisfactory, other stakeholders have participated more. The donors and 
the ministry, in addition to some agents from the civil society, are so-called partners 
within the Mozambican education sector. Many of my respondents emphasized the 
joint review mission in 1998, the turning-point of the process of change into a SWAp 
in Mozambique (chapter 4). This, they argued, created the background for a more 
holistic and comprehensive policy approach, with the donors from one side, and the 
government from the other side. They also called attention to the pre-appraisal meeting 
in 1997, and its joint aide memoir (chapter 4), and argued that this agreement to create 
a common pool of funds has brought the process forward, towards a SWAp. The term 
partnership is central in the new approach, and many of my informants saw the 
introduction of the SWAp as an important first step in the process of achieving a 
genuine partnership. As one of my informants put it:  
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I could say that the first ESSP enabled the initial steps in the line which is 
considered the ideal (…). [O]f course, it still remains some problems. There 
are still (…) marks of the past. It means that it is easier to work separately, in 
the project way, rather than to work towards a global vision.  
(Representative for a governmental institution). 
But many of my informants argued that already with the introduction of the SWAp, the 
partners experienced difficulties. One of my informants from the donor community 
claimed that the change into a sector wide approach was a shock even to some donors. 
One representative for the ministry agrees, as (s)he affirms that: 
(…) [L]et me say that it was not an easy process. The main difficulty was to 
bring all the donors on board. That has shown to be a very complex, sensitive 
and difficult exercise.  
(Representative for the ministry).  
It appeared to be a problem not only that some donors were reluctant to join the 
SWAp, but also that the government tended to fall back into the old project approach: 
I have seen that government sometimes feels more comfortable to deal with 
donors individually, so that they can strike deals and get programs going. 
Because, we have to be honest, especially in the democratic mode of 
government, where we have the five year mandate, (…) they want to get those 
quick wins within the period. So if they see the Japanese coming with five 
secondary schools, they will grab that. And they will not be very happy to 
discuss that in the donor SWAp. That has happened, and it is happening right 
here in Mozambique.  
(Representative for the World Bank).  
As the citation shows, the government might get tempted to make deals outside the 
SWAp, to have something to show to before the elections. This creates a situation that 
undermines the whole idea of the SWAp. Even though all stakeholders appear to be 
positive to the SWAp and its intentions, there seems to be reluctance in their 
commitment to it, and it seems like none of the stakeholders were pleased with the 
progress of the change into the SWAp: 
Why does it take so long, given that it is a very good and appealing approach 
to everybody, to make it work? Because I would say, we are still not there yet, 
and we are five years down the road. We are still struggling with putting 
blocks into place for a smooth sailing SWAp.  
(Representative for the World Bank).  
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Most of my respondents did, however, express a continued belief in the process, and 
argued that the good results were yet to come. It was emphasized that the new 
approach was in many respects better than the preceding ones, and that it was a process 
that was brought forward, to fulfil its intentions. 
Takala and Marope (2003) claim that the SWAp in Mozambique is characterized by 
divergent understandings -for instance of the concept of partnership. One of my 
informants from Unesco emphasized the fact that we are dealing with a cross-cultural 
partnership: 
And the problem with partnership is that you have two cultures. (…) There is 
problem with uncertainty avoidance. The uncertainty avoidance is very low. 
You don’t want to have risks. In that case you prefer detailed plans, you prefer 
to see how your money is being used, every piece, and it’s a culture. (…)But in 
another culture, like ours, sometimes details may irritate. Not that people 
want to use money unwittingly, but there are risks. That is to say, as long as 
we agree, have consensus, that is not a problem (…).Because each of us have 
our own ethics, values, and how to react and decide when the times are 
difficult. I would say on both sides of the partnership, you have problem of 
preparation for multi cultural partnership.  
(Representative for Unesco). 
(S)he argued that people from the West are characterized by uncertainty avoidance; 
they are not willing to take risks, everything must be planned in details, and agreed 
upon in a written form. This is opposite to the African culture, where communication 
is different, s(he) claimed:  
Our culture, in some countries, we have a type of communication that might 
not be understood. Saying no is difficult (…), somebody might not say no, not 
because he doesn’t want to say no, but because he knows the consequences of 
the no. So you judge your response by the consequences that you know it is 
going to have. You eventually say yes, in the hope that one day you will be 
able to untie yourself from it. And when you untie yourself, you have your 
problem with your partners; but you said. So, the communication in our 
society is more understood in a context, rather than in a one- to-one situation, 
or written.  
(Representative for Unesco). 
This creates a situation where problems of different understandings occur, and these 
problems are in turn dealt with in different manners. My respondent put the problem 
with the Swedish audit, mentioned in chapter 3, forward as an example of how these 
two cultures have not been able to solve the problem in a satisfying manner. The 
donors “blow the whistle”, stop the funding, and then want to dialogue on what 
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happened, and how to solve it. But the other party is left in embarrassment, and the 
relationship goes sour. This specific case has had a great impact on the education 
sector in Mozambique recently, as the funding was stopped, and much time was spent 
in discussing the matter. It also led to a fragmentation of the partnership, my informant 
claimed. (S)he argued that this will not improve until the leadership understands the 
environment they are working in, or alternatively, until the leadership changes. And 
(s)he maintained that there is also a problem that each country brings its own culture, 
rules and systems into the partnership: 
But, later I think, we looked around, that we found out that maybe each 
country has got its own rules, culture, program, and it was not so easy.  
(Representative for Unesco). 
I got information from other respondents as well, that there had been tensions also 
between donors. One representative for the ministry explained that to them it is 
important to work with the donors that understand them, and agree with them, so that 
they can become stronger in negotiations with other donors.  From the preceding 
discussions on the gap between rhetoric and reality when it comes to the slogans of the 
SWAp, this seems like a good strategy to solve the problem of pressure from the 
donors. As long as the government finds some partners within the sector, with whom 
to cooperate closely, they can more easily achieve their objectives when confronted 
with other partners. In a negotiation climate where there are tensions between the 
different partners, this can turn out to be an advantage for the local government. One 
informant from a governmental institution claimed that the issues of discrepancy were 
solved after the joint mission meeting in 1998. Agreements and disagreements were 
put on the table, and after that they started to work as a team, (s)he maintained.  
This sounds, of course, very straight forward, but I got the impression that the 
partnership was not a genuine partnership. It did not function according to the 
intentions of the SWAp, and this will be discussed further in the following analysis. 
7.2.2 Cooperation between donors 
Increased cooperation can be a tool to rationalize the time and resources spent, both 
from the donors’ side and the government’s side (chapter 4). But there is that risk that 
the donor cooperation gets so strong within the SWAp, that it becomes difficult for the 
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government to make actual choices and accomplish their own policy. The emphasis on 
local ownership and partnership might promote a need for increased coordination 
between the donors, to neutralize the feeling of lost control, which might occur. Many 
of my informants once again brought up the Swedish audit report as a concrete 
example of current interest, of what might happen when the donors cooperate closely. 
It shows how strong the donor power might become in situations of disagreements. 
The situation was discussed amongst the donors, and the result was serious for the 
Mozambican education sector. One of my respondents explained: 
(…) [T]he donors’ reaction (…) was: “Oh! This is a crisis, stop everything 
else. Let’s make sure resources are not going to be abused”. That has cost the 
government, because among the donors we tried to have a unified voice. The 
illness that has been identified in this Swedish program has sympthomized the 
unforeseen weakness of the system, and the reaction of the donors was to stop 
everything. Now, we have programs funded by the World Bank, and we have 
external audits every year, and our external audits just came out, not so many 
months ago, and they were clean. What reasons do we have to stop the World 
Bank project? We don’t. But the government suffers. (…)[T]he basket has 
been stopped, because of this issue, so all activities that were tied to this 
basket, are on a temporarily suspension. (…) Now, if the ministry had plans to 
use the pool funds to buy materials for this new semester, it can’t. You see, it’s 
problematic for the moment.  
(Representative for the World Bank). 
Whether the actions taken in this particular case were correct or not is not a question to 
be answered here, but the point that many of my respondents’ were making, was that 
the reaction did not take cultural differences into account, and it was not a good way to 
encourage continued partnership. The increased cooperation between the donors 
certainly functioned to increase their power in this particular case. Another of my 
informants from Unesco did claim, though, that the situation following the Swedish 
audit report had contributed to improving the situation, and made the ESSP II, the plan 
following the ESSP I, more credible. (S)he argued that the SWAp, with the 
harmonization of the donors, and the fact that the partners negotiate the whole plan, 
gives the donors stronger negotiation power and hence, puts up an increased financial 
credibility for the ESSP. The Swedish audit has contributed to increase the degree of 
transparency further, (s)he argued. Here, there seems to me to be a discrepancy in the 
understanding of what the SWAp is all about.  It appears to be two ways to view the 
SWAp as positive. The SWAp can provide the local government with more decision 
power and ownership. However, the preceding citation shows that others seem to stress 
the fact that the SWAp gives the donors increased influence and control, through 
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increased cooperation and an extended field of negotiation, and that this promotes a 
more credible policy.  To me, this seems to be contradicting understandings. Two such 
different understandings of what the SWAp is about can impossibly be a good starting 
point for building a partnership. If a partnership is supposed to be a relationship 
between equal partners, all intentions should be in the open from the beginning. If the 
rhetoric of the SWAp is so vague that both these understandings are acceptable, there 
is a need to revise its intentions. I am of the opinion that if a partner only feels safe in a 
partnership when (s)he is in control, it cannot be said to be a genuine partnership. And 
in that case, the SWAp does not function according to its intentions. 
7.2.3 Local ownership 
The objective of local ownership is one of the positive features of the SWAp (chapter 
4). During my interviews it was striking how little civil society knew about the new 
approach: 
Yes, I am not very well informed about this, I think the SWAp is when the 
donors put their funds in a basket. This basket belongs, I mean, the 
government controls this basket. So, I am not actually sure about what is 
going on.  
(Representative for civil society). 
Nevertheless, while talking to my other informants there was an overall agreement that 
the educational policy had sprung out from the Mozambican politicians themselves. 
Some of them also emphasized the basket funding, and how this is contributing to 
increased local ownership: 
When you have (…) [basket funding] the advantage is that (…) we have 
resources, allocated by the donors, and then, according to our plan of 
activities, we budget the activities based on the resources that we have got. So 
this money does not have flecks. That’s one of the merits of the SWAp. (…) It 
is the government that has control, to spend, and to account for it, in an 
agreed mechanism, an agreed procedure. 
 (Representative for the ministry). 
The Mozambican ownership to the new education for citizenship curriculum 
mentioned in chapter 3 was emphasized. As my informants put it, the planning of the 
subject was initiated by an expressed demand from the Mozambican society for 
education to contribute to the state-building and unifying effort, and I got the 
 
 
84
impression that external intervention was not experienced during the work with the 
production of its content: 
I would say that we had no problem, in fact. (…) [W]e have prepared these 
materials in accordance with our reality. (…) So, in term of imposition, we did 
not experience it, in this particular case. It was home ground decision.  
(Representative for a governmental institution).  
There were also clear signals that the concrete content of the ESSP had not been an 
issue of controversy: 
 (…) [W]hen we developed the strategic plan we have identified three major 
objectives; access and equity, which is one; quality; and capacity building. 
And we have all agreed on that, so all the content is towards achieving those 
three main objectives. And there is a total agreement amongst all of us.  
(Representative for the ministry). 
These three objectives were mentioned by many of my informants from the different 
stakeholders, and I got the impression that these objectives were in concordance with 
the understanding of all of them. Connected to this, and in concordance with the 
findings of Buchert (2002), one informant argued that the Mozambicans are now better 
educated than in the past. (S)he claimed that this is contributing to improve the 
situation, and making local ownership easier to maintain:  
So, today even the external experts, when they come here, they have a 
[dialogue partner]. He can also contribute, can express opinion, so no expert 
come and say that everything should look like that. So it comes from them, but 
it is also clear that they can learn from us. We can exchange opinion, equally. 
So the situation has changed a lot.  
(Representative for a governmental institution). 
To continue this development, some of my respondents expressed the need for priority 
of education on higher levels for the development of the country and its independence: 
It was studies in the 70s, 80s on education, where people said, it is enough 
with basic education, as long as you can produce enough to pay back the 
debts and whatever. But today we are talking about the links, not only to 
secondary education, but also to higher. If you want to be self sufficient, you 
should link higher education to your investigation (…). 
 (Representative for Unesco). 
The prioritizing of higher education is nevertheless not a straightforward process, 
because even though the ESSP and the new curriculum was introduced by the ministry, 
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and initiated by the Mozambicans, many of my informants argued that the international 
partners had had some influence. The EFA process was strong, internationally, and set 
some standards according to which educational policy should centre. The focus on 
basic education in the ESSP is obvious, and in concordance with EFA. How this came 
about, and to what extent this is due to an influence of external partners, is not for me 
to speculate on. One of my informants from the ministry claims that this was a local 
decision: 
(…) [I]t was clear for Mozambique that the priority would be basic education, 
not because of the Jomtien understanding, but because internally, the situation 
analysis recommended us to start from basic education. Because,  in a country 
like Mozambique, where you have high levels of illiteracy; with a number of 
students in school age population out of the system, it doesn’t make sense  that 
you prioritize secondary or higher education, if your foundations are so weak. 
So, for us it was very clear that basic education, meaning in the case of 
Mozambique primary education, was to be prioritized. Of course, Jomtien 
appeared as an opportunity to accelerate the internal understanding on 
prioritizing basic education. But the decision was not taken because of 
Jomtien conference.  
(Representative for the ministry). 
One must nevertheless realize that there is of course that opportunity, that  a spoken 
priority of basic education by the international donors, will make it more tempting for 
developing countries to follow this line, to secure funds for the sector. I have already 
pointed to the connection between development aid resources and aid dependency. My 
informants seemed to express contentment with the level of local ownership. But even 
though there was agreement on the three objectives of the ESSP, their priority and 
sequence seemed to be more problematic. Throughout my interviews, there were some 
aspects of donor intervention that were repeatedly mentioned, and this to a great extent 
concerned the implementation of the Fast Track Initiative (FTI).  
7.2.4 Fast Track Initiative (FTI) and conditionality 
In chapter 4 I outlined how the international focus on the goal of universal education 
for all resulted in an initiative to enhance the process to reach the objectives. Talks 
concerning this Fast Track Initiative gave me a somewhat altered impression of the 
level of local ownership. Quite a few of my informants, both from the government and 
the donor side, emphasized that already early in the process, there was a discussion of 
whether the FTI should be an integrated part of the Education Sector Strategic Plan 
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(ESSP), or whether it should be an additional plan. It was important for the ministry 
that the ESSP was the central document, and they saw no positive effects of having 
more, parallel plans. Additional plans would only lead to confusion and undermining 
of the strategic plan. One has eventually come to an agreement of integration of both 
the EFA objectives and the FTI within the ESSP framework.  
There were also discussions and misunderstandings concerning the funding of the FTI. 
Both government and some donors believed that this would provide the education 
sector with new resources, but it turned out that this was not the case: 
 (…) [I]t’s still not finalized, by the way. Because in a way there was kind of a 
misunderstanding, the government of Mozambique first understood that these 
would be completely new resources. But they are not new resources, they are 
existing ones. What they are asking to do is to redirect the resources to the 
FTI priorities. And there, there are some disagreements. And even the donors 
misunderstood the things.  
(Representative for Unesco).  
In addition to these early disagreements at the introduction of the FTI, there have also 
been some instances of what my informants called “detail intervention” connected to 
the FTI. As I understand it, the donors, and mainly the World Bank as coordinator of 
the FTI, put forward some demands that were difficult to accept for the Mozambican 
government. These demands mainly concerned the discussion of access versus 
increased quality, certain aspects of teachers’ education, and the neglect of secondary 
education. One informant from the ministry explained quite clearly why the 
discussions of quality versus access were important to the government: 
The government’s point at that time was that there is no way in Mozambique 
to say that: “Well, we will be concentrating on quality improvement, and then 
the issue of expanding access and so on, will come after”. How can we do that 
in a country like Mozambique with more than 80% illiteracy rate, with only 
50% of enrolment rate for kids? How do you say that my priority will be 
improvement of the quality of education, you know, leaving out a number, a 
huge number of kids. So, the first point of disagreement was the government 
policy of expanding access, along with the improvement of quality of 
education. We had some donors saying; “No, that is not possible”. And the 
World Bank was very strong on that. And you know that the World Bank is 
also, I would say, technically very strong.  
(Representative for the ministry). 
(S)he went on to explain how this created two positions within the donors, with the 
World Bank on one side, and the others, led by the Nordic countries and the UN-
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agencies, on the other side, supporting the government view. (S)he claimed that they 
managed to bring the World Bank on board, because of the Bank’s fear to be excluded 
from the process.  This clearly demonstrates the importance of a strong and decisive 
leadership during negotiations, in addition to the importance of continuing the 
cooperation with the partners already in agreement. These are means to create 
increased pressure on reluctant donors, and it shows that it is possible to get local 
decisions through. 
Another area of detail intervention connected to the FTI mentioned by my informants 
was teachers’ education and their salaries. This is an important area that is also 
interconnected to the discussions of the quality of education: 
This is what we want; not being told what to do. Not being told by the donors 
that for teachers under this category; pay them that. For teachers under that 
category; don’t recruit them to teach. And this was what the Fast Track was 
getting into. Dictating in very single details of what the government was going 
to do if they were to achieve. And teacher salaries were one of the problems. 
(…) And they have calculations that they make, the Bank is very good in that. 
They made calculations. Their argument is that to have a strategy which is 
sustainable, you have to limit the salaries, you have to not get the most 
qualified teachers here, and things like that 
(Representative for the ministry). 
The FTI, with the World Bank in the lead, wanted to decrease teachers’ salaries and 
recruit less qualified teachers, while the ministry saw this as a deterioration of quality 
rather than an improvement. I did not get the impression that this issue was solved, but 
still a matter of concern to the ministry and the universities. Quite a few of my 
respondents, both on government and donor side, blamed the lack of qualified teachers 
on the neglect of secondary education, which in turn leads to decreased quality of 
primary education:
And then we have seen that we have problem with teachers, (…) it means that 
we should do something for secondary education. If we don’t develop 
secondary education, because you are saying that your priority is primary 
education, it means that you cannot have enough human resources to meet 
your need related to primary education. So to solve the problems of primary 
education, you should pay attention to secondary education. (…) So that is 
what we need, even if our partners don’t immediately understand decisions 
like that (…). 
(Representative for a governmental institution). 
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This is also the last area of discrepancy connected to the FTI; the dilemma of priority 
between primary- and other levels of education: 
There is that risk that other areas may be neglected, because they are not 
looking at any other levels than basic education. (…) I heard something like, 
the government should make a commitment, but don’t write down the 
numbers, because I am not sure, commitment that 50-52% of the budget 
allocated into education, would go into basic education, so the other 48% 
would have to go into different areas. But I don’t understand the rational for 
it. That’s connected to the FTI, and the World Bank.  
(Representative for the ministry). 
Connected to what was stated earlier about the funding of the FTI; that there are no 
new but rather a redistribution of old resources, the existence of these conditionalities 
become even more problematic.  Overall, the obvious existence of conditionalities 
connected to the FTI, makes the earlier stated high level of local ownership 
questionable.  
What is interesting is that even though there are all these conditionalities connected to 
the FTI, mainly put forward by the World Bank, it seems as if the donors are 
simultaneously rejecting any responsibility for the results of the FTI policy, all in 
concordance with Klees (2001). One of my informants from the ministry admitted that 
this is the case, the World Bank has been asked to be the coordinating donor of the 
initiative only. The initiative is said to be the respective recipient countries’ and their 
donors’; it is their thinking, and consequently their responsibility. But my informant 
argued that this is debatable, and claimed that the World Bank is on edge with the 
others. Another of my informants also considered the issue of responsibility for policy 
results. (S)he spoke in favour of the independence of the recipient countries, but with 
an argumentation that is not really in concordance with the partnership rhetoric: 
(…) [W]e had the seminar in the past, between donors. One of the issues that 
was raised, was that we should not get into the, with the ministry. We should 
let them do their job. Because, tomorrow, you know what happens, if anything 
fails, we will also be attacked. Let’s work together, but they have the primary 
responsibility for action. And this I think is becoming clear for everyone, that 
the ministry is the ultimate responsible for education. Others are supporting, 
and doing their best with this partnership. 
 (Representative for Unesco). 
(S)he maintained that one should leave the responsibility to the recipient countries, as a 
means for having the donors’ backs free. To me, this does not sound as a good 
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foundation for partnership, but rather reveals another discrepancy in the understanding 
of the partnership. Instead of promoting the partnership as a possibility for increased, 
genuine local ownership, as I understand the intentions of the SWAp, the donor 
community seems to have other intentions as well: Increased donor cooperation can 
give increased donor control and the focus on local ownership can lead to less donor 
responsibility. That the recipient government takes responsibility is of course 
imperative for the promotion of local ownership and empowerment. But as long as the 
policy planning is done in a partnership, where there in addition are expressed 
conditionalities from one party, it seems dubious that only one of the partners should 
take responsibility for the results. I therefore view the FTI as an external influence of 
undemocratic character. If the government can be pressured by external organizations 
and banks to make decisions that they do not view as beneficial to their people, I 
question whether this can be said to be democracy to the individual Mozambican. This 
stands as another indication of the partnership as not functioning according to its 
intentions, and I would not call it a genuine partnership. 
7.2.5 Lack of trust 
Overall, I got the impression that the partnership within the education sector in 
Mozambique was not unproblematic, in concordance with the findings of Takala 
(2003) referred to in chapter 4. It seems to me that there are still problems with the 
introduction of the SWAp, and like many other places, the rhetoric is not yet mirrored 
in reality: 
My personal opinion is that I would say the intentions are good, but our 
mindset has not changed. I am talking in terms of donors. Because that is 
where, to me, the problem is. We still want to influence how government does 
its business in the interest of our headquarters thinking. While the rhetoric is 
about the SWAp, the mindsets, or maybe the heart is in the right place, but the 
mindset is taking too long to change. To me that is where we have a problem 
which I am seeing.  
(Representative for the World Bank).  
That reality is not in concordance with the intensions is nevertheless no surprise, as I 
have also upheld in chapter 4. It appears that one of the problems with the partnership 
within the education sector in Mozambique is that the donors have a need of 
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controlling the ministry to make sure that their objectives and good intentions are 
reached: 
I think people understand the principal of a SWAp approach. And I think 
everybody is in favor of the principal. My problem is the implementation of it; 
it still holds people’s minds on to the old system of project support. Let me be 
clear. In our minds, we are not able to lose control. But that’s a very personal 
view. It’s still a way to go, and it will take some time.  
(Representative for the ministry). 
The continuation of old practices might be closely connected to the high level of 
corruption in Mozambique mentioned in chapter 3, and maybe also connected to 
cultural differences within the partnership. As I have already mentioned, there can be 
understandable reasons as to why some conditionalities are set. One of my informants 
explains it like this: 
In order to be providing funds, the donors need a plan to know; how are you 
going to do this, what is going to be the priorities, to have a look at your 
resources compared to your priorities (…). I think the first issue was mainly in 
terms of allocation of resources, to be able to allocate the use of resources, 
and to see that these resources are used in a rational manner, and according 
to the priorities of the ministry, who made the plan.  
(Representative for Unesco). 
It looks as if there exists a lack of trust between the partners, and this does no good for 
a partnership. One needs to keep in mind that the donors have a mandate in securing 
that their money is used according to its intentions. It is in this way that they can 
encourage and secure a democratic development. But it is problematic when the 
government at times feels dictated by its partners and is not convinced by their 
suggestions. One of my informants expresses this lack of trust clearly: 
Sometimes I have a feeling that [the donors] involve too much in details. Just 
imagine their weekly meetings (…). Once the strategy is in place, and we have 
agreed on this consensus, we should leave them to work. But if you are there 
every weekend, every day, what do you do? (…) It is a lack of trust. You are 
not confident that they would manage to do what you have agreed they should 
do. If on a family level, there are people that tell their children they should get 
clean, maybe one should give the standards of what clean is? (…) I think 
Mozambique is the only country in Southern Africa, where the acceptance of 
working with the donors goes beyond what would be called intervention. (…) 
So I think, this is true, that maybe at some point it is understood that there are 
too much intervention. And because I don’t think, weekly meetings, what do 
you discuss? What do you discuss!? Always discuss the same things?  
(Representative for Unesco).  
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The high activity by the donors, and also the high degree of intervention accepted by 
the Mozambican government, stand out as a lack of trust within the partnership. It is 
obvious that there are issues to be solved before this cooperation can work. It seems 
like a clear tendency that the development aid partnership within the education sector 
does not function as a genuine partnership. I am, however, of the opinion that the aid 
relationship has to function as a partnership, if it is to contribute to the democratization 
of Mozambique. It is thus timely to ask whether the present SWAp is another obstacle 
to the democratization of Mozambique, or whether it can contribute to a democratic 
development.  
7.2.6 What characterizes the development aid partnership in this 
context?  
In the preceding I have addressed the second research question for this thesis: What 
characterizes the development aid partnership in this context? In my opinion, and 
according to the theoretical outline in chapter 4, there is no doubt that the rhetoric of 
the SWAp, and its intentions, provide good means for democratization. A holistic 
approach that sees the sector in a bigger perspective and works towards a credible 
policy is important. Furthermore, the focus on participation by all, cooperation 
between partners and local ownership is crucial, and positive for a democratic and 
efficient development. This is also focused upon by my informants, as they view the 
process as positive and ongoing, and a step forward for a genuine partnership.  
But there are also clear tendencies of difficulties within the SWAp. Some of these 
difficulties are reluctance in the commitment by the different stakeholders, tension 
between the donors, and there are also problems with divergent understandings and 
cultural differences within the partnership. My material also shows a tendency of 
disagreements on the outcome of the increased cooperation between donors; many 
argued that this leads to less local ownership, but one of my informants from Unesco 
also meant that this makes the policy more credible. Overall, this shows two different 
understandings of what the SWAp should be. When it comes to the concrete 
discussions of the level of local ownership, there was a clear tendency that my 
informants from civil society were not well informed about the SWAp and what it was 
about. The other informants, however, were pleased with the level of local ownership 
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to the Education Sector Strategic Plan and the national curriculum. They also 
emphasized basket funding as contributory for increased local ownership. This stands, 
however, in sharp contrast to the impression I got of the level of local ownership 
connected to the Fast Track Initiative, where there were disagreements on several 
issues, and where conditionalities were tied to aid from external donors.  
All these difficulties within the SWAp stand as a result of, or they result in, a lack of 
trust within the partnership. Once again, the tendency in my material shows that 
rhetoric is not mirrored in reality. The high degree of intervention, and the acceptance 
of it, shows that the development aid partnership cannot be characterized as a genuine 
partnership; the SWAp does not function according to its intentions. Some of the 
interventions might be justified, as one should not prioritize adjustment to the local 
context at the cost of the democratic ideal and human rights, and the external partners 
play an important role in stimulating a democratic development. I nevertheless find it 
timely to question whether this relationship is a good starting point for democratization 
of Mozambique, as the ordinary Mozambicans cannot trust that the decisions taken are 
actually taken by their own, elected politicians. The Mozambicans need to be able to 
control and influence the impact that the development aid agents have on their country. 
There has to be equal participation by both parts in these processes. For that, the 
Mozambicans need to diminish their lack of democratic experience, and I suggest that 
education for citizenship is contributory in this respect. In that case, it seems likely that 
the SWAp can function according to its intentions and contribute to a democratic 
Mozambique, rather than to function as an obstacle to this democratization. 
By now, I have addressed my two first research questions. This has been done to 
provide a background understanding for the focus of my main research question. In the 
following one of the potentials available for the continued process of democratization 
in Mozambique is outlined, as I go on to the final question of my thesis: Which role 
does education for citizenship play in the Mozambican context? 
7.3 Mozambican democracy through education for citizenship 
Throughout this thesis, I have theoretically argued that education for citizenship is an 
instrument of major importance for securing and promoting democratization. I have 
maintained, both through theory and empirical data, that the Mozambican people are in 
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need of this education. I have theoretically argued that education for citizenship can 
play an important role in the process of democratization, in at least two ways; as a 
socializing agent through the conveyance of values needed for learning to co-exist; and 
as a change agent through the emphasis on a critical attitude to enhance the political 
culture of a society. In the following outline I intend to explore the concrete situation 
in Mozambique, through my informants’ statements.  
7.3.1 Conveying values for co-existence 
The history of war and conflicts was often put forward as important in connection to 
the democratization of Mozambique. One of my informants from the World Bank told 
me to feel the atmosphere in the streets of Maputo; (s)he argued that there was no one 
that wanted to go back to war. The history of war has contributed to a situation where 
the Mozambican people are very open for a new era, but also to a situation with a 
nation of people in need of learning to co-exist again: 
(…) [S]ome of the innovations have to do with the concept of democracy for 
our children, the concept of culture of peace, which is extremely important in 
a country like Mozambique, coming from the conflict. The concept of 
tolerance, you know, learning to live together, even with people of different 
opinions, and so on.  
(Representative for the ministry). 
According to Boyce (1999), the avoidance of particularism and also universalism 
becomes imperative for a multi-ethnic society like Mozambique. One needs to learn to 
live together, even though there are differences of opinion: 
(…) [F]or countries like Mozambique, which has just come out of war, this is 
also emphasized, that we have to co-exist. This is our nation, it belongs to all 
of us, there may be differences of opinion; there are ways of resolving it.  
(Representative for the World Bank). 
The focus on co-existence was a clear tendency throughout all of my interviews. I have 
stressed the importance of a feeling of unity for the state-building project. To be able 
to go into the process of creating an ever evolving culture, like Boyce (1999) 
prescribes, the differences of opinion must be resolved.  From the African tradition we 
have the dialogue concept of palaver, and several of the theorists used throughout this 
thesis forward the dialogue as an important tool - it is for instance emphasized through 
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the deliberative democracy-type. Some of my informants shared this view, and one 
informant argues: 
[It is an important part of education for citizenship to develop strategies of] 
how to dialogue, how to learn to understand others. (…) [A]nd we also hope 
not only to discuss those aspects with pupils, with children, but we hope also 
to discuss those issues with the parents, the stakeholders, the community in 
general. (…) It isn’t easy, but it is possible, to have an open discussion 
between everybody.  
(Representative for a governmental institution). 
Connected to the discussion concerning the problems of subcultures and the power of 
deciding which values or aims to emphasize, the dialogue form, and the objective of 
including “the community in general”, is promising. From this informant’s statement 
one might draw the conclusion that participation by all, inclusion of the mass culture, 
is emphasized. This was, however, an issue only briefly touched upon during my 
interviews, and from the above discussions concerning the SWAp and participation by 
civil society, the picture looks different. 
Many of my informants expressed the urge for the introduction of good values, 
connected to the need of learning to co-exist again. On this background, education for 
citizenship was introduced: 
Problems of the lack of values, market economy, these things, meant that the 
peoples’ behavior changed, and values were lost, and it was necessary to 
introduce civic and moral education.  
(Representative for a governmental institution, my translation). 
It seems to be a clear belief that education can contribute to convey the values needed. 
It might appear like my informants view this as a transfer of values to passive students, 
and not as a preferable, more active internalization of values. The main point, however, 
is that they argue that common values are important, and should be emphasized. Here, 
the role of the citizen as a responsible person, doing her/his duties and contributing to 
the common good, is imperative: 
[Education for citizenship] is to develop a responsible citizen (…). The 
mindsets would have to be (…) much more (…) aware that we are part of a 
society. And what I do as an individual has implications for other humans and 
the environment around me.  
(Representative for the World Bank). 
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The emphasis on the closeness to others reminds us of the traditional African culture of 
communality. The values needed are those emphasized in the concept of ubuntu:  
They need to learn to know and respect the diversity of culture and religions, 
this is very important. (…) [W]e initiate cooperation, toleration, solidarity. 
Everything starts as the ‘I’ ends, you, the neighborhood, the people in the 
neighborhood, and then on the national level and the world (…). It is all the 
principles of human rights; we also introduce tolerance, solidarity, mutual 
help, love, cooperation. This all makes part of the human rights, of the 
democracy, so the child has to create and understand these tendencies.  
(Representative for a governmental institution, my translation). 
The concept of ubuntu is followed by an emphasis on democratic values and the 
development of a political culture as part of the strategy for co-existence. Education 
for citizenship is seen as a means for creating good citizens that cooperate to contribute 
to a good development for a united Mozambique. This is also evident through their 
emphasis on education for citizenship as a subject for creating patriotism in the child: 
We initiate in the child to have patriotism and high spirit, to value its culture 
and its tradition, so this we also initiate in the discipline of civic and moral 
education. 
 (Representative for a governmental institution, my translation). 
Education is important as a socializing agent in all societies, and Nyerere (1968) also 
argued that this was the case in pre-colonial Africa. But it is obvious that in a country 
like Mozambique, with a history of war and conflicts, in a state of mal-development, 
the need for state-building and uniting factors are even more crucial, and this view was 
also a clear tendency in my empirical material. From the information I got, I am 
confident that the Mozambican education, through its new education for citizenship 
curriculum, has the best prospects for promoting a political culture based on solidarity, 
tolerance and co-existence.  
This emphasis on education for citizenship as value-conveying and uniting might not 
be very surprising. What I do find interesting, however, is how my informants 
reflected on the critical aspect of education for citizenship; education for citizenship’s 
role in creating a critical consciousness. The theoretical outline has shown that these 
two aspects of education are not necessarily in conflict, but could be emphasized 
simultaneously. However, according to Dewey (1916), education’s role as a socializing 
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agent and a conveyer of values can become problematic if the aims of the Mozambican 
society are not democratic enough. 
7.3.2 What about the critical consciousness? 
Throughout this thesis I have emphasized the critical aspect of education for 
citizenship, and the important role that it can play in the process of democratization. I 
found it interesting to see what my informants understood by the term, and one of my 
informants from civil society reflected on the issue in quite a similar way to the theory 
that I have outlined in chapter 6: 
Education for citizenship is to know what is your right, your human right, 
what are the basic rights that you have like a citizen of the country. (…) Many 
people don’t know that eating is their natural right; they believe it is a favour 
of the government. I think this is the first right, but some people, many people, 
90% of the people, think this is a favour from the government, you know, 
because they are the leaders of the people.  
(Representative for civil society) 
S(he) also emphasizes participation, and the important role that education for 
citizenship plays in that respect:  
[Education for citizenship] should also make it possible for all citizens to have 
space in the public sphere. It should inform people about these rights, their 
rights to vote (…).This means, to me, education for citizenship is participation. 
It is that the citizen should participate in all decisions and questions. (…) 
Many persons are bad in participating, because we do not have information. 
(…) There are people who do not know their rights, because they do not have 
information. 
(Representative for civil society) 
Even when questioning the dilemma between unity and consensus for development 
versus the need for critical citizens, (s)he maintained the focus on the critical aspect: 
Yes, but these two situations are necessary, because if you have only one side, 
building the construction, the better future, it is necessary to be critical. 
Where we have the critical people, we find the better way to develop. 
(Representative for civil society) 
Also one informant from a governmental institution reflected on the issue in a similar 
way:  
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Yes, we teach the child never to accept everything. Never take everything for 
granted. So, the child must have a creative spirit, a critical spirit, to know how 
to criticize. So, to know to say what is the truth and what is a lie. 
(Representative for a governmental institution, my translation). 
From these statements it could seem like the critical aspect of education for citizenship 
is taken care of, and that there is awareness concerning the matter. This was, however, 
not the tendency within my material. I got an impression that many of my informants 
were reluctant to speak about the critical aspect. I do not know whether this was 
caused by ignorance, avoidance, or if it could simply be that they did not understand 
my questions concerning the critical aspect. The tendency is nevertheless that most of 
them are vague when speaking about the critical aspect, and the conversation often 
turned onto other subjects. I experienced that questions concerning critical 
consciousness turned back into a conversation about the subject of co-existence: 
In fact, in our subject, our goal to be critical does not necessarily mean to be 
in opposite to the basic principles. Conversely, we hope through this subject to 
consolidate the principle of how to live together, even with different opinions. 
 (Representative for a governmental institution). 
In my opinion, this citation shows that the focus on co-existence represses the 
emphasis on the critical aspect. It can also be said to reflect a quite naïve position, not 
taking into account the real implications of what the meaning of criticism and differing 
views actually means. This is also the case with the following citation, which expresses 
a somewhat simplistic understanding of the issues, avoiding the actual dilemma of 
allowing different views that perhaps cannot be compromised: 
I think that we can have positive and negative critics. So, critics don’t have to 
be solely negative. So what we want to do is; the objective is positive, the 
“fin” is good. Because the ideas can be variable, but we have to have one 
unique objective, which is good for all. There are different ideas, in the whole 
world, people have different ideas, but the objective is that the things are good 
for all. If you have an idea, another have another idea, and another idea, join 
all these ideas, and we can be able to construct a positive thing, a good thing. 
So, I think that the advantage of democracy is the liberty of expression, where 
you have lots of ideas, so the objective is that all can give ideas for the good 
ending, for an ultimate thing, for the good for all.  
(Representative for a governmental institution, my translation). 
This citation expresses the belief in consensus as an ultimate goal. This is of course a 
noble objective, and could stand as an ideal for democratic practices. But again, this 
belief stands for me as a quite “naïve” view on criticism and co-existence. It might be 
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that the wish to reach a consensus is so great, that the ability to see conflicting interests 
as a problem is not present.  
There was also a tendency through these vague statements that my informants went on 
with explanations and excuses as to why the introduction of the critical aspect was so 
difficult. Some of these explanations were connected to the previous citations 
concerning the repression of the critical aspect, and emphasized cultural reasons for the 
difficulties: 
We are culturally based on harmony. And therefore, a conflict is not seen, for 
example assertiveness, assertiveness may be seen as aggressiveness. Because 
you may not agree with someone, but you can not be confrontational. So, all 
this issues should be taken into account when you design a program [of 
education for citizenship]. For example in your culture, (…) being 
confrontational is ok. It shows you have been true to yourself, you have been 
integral, you have been assertive. But in some countries, you need to do it 
indirectly, to use the stories, the story of the elephant or the king. 
(Representative for Unesco) 
It seems like criticism might be looked upon as aggressiveness in a culture of harmony, 
and there was a clear tendency that they emphasized that being critical did not 
necessarily mean to be in opposition. There was no problem in having conflicting 
views, as long as the objectives were the same. The important thing was that one learns 
how to live together, even though there exists a variety of views. 
Other explanations were more connected to the concrete situation in Mozambique at 
present: 
Well, when I realize your GDP per capita is, you know Norway is a very rich 
country, and in Mozambique our GDP per capita is lower than 300 US $, so it 
is a very, very poor country. So democracy also, what do you mean about 
democracy in a poor country like Mozambique? (…) So, what I am trying to 
say is that given the situation of vulnerability because of the poverty 
Mozambique is facing, the concept of democracy will not be complete. 
(Representative for the ministry). 
There seemed to be agreement that there were other issues to be solved before one 
could focus on the “luxury” of promoting a critical aspect of education. One of my 
informants from civil society meant that people needed food on the table before one 
could concentrate on the critical aspect.  
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Throughout this thesis I have repeatedly emphasized education for citizenship as a tool 
for the elevation of a critical consciousness within the Mozambican society. I have 
emphasized the critical aspect of this education, and investigated my informants’ 
reflections concerning this issue. Some of my informants also mentioned the concrete 
subject of education for citizenship, which is recently introduced in the Mozambican 
schools. One a few occasions they actually criticized the government and the way the 
subject had been implemented: 
(…) Education for citizenship in itself is a good means of achieving good 
democracies as one outcome, that I think I have no doubts. My doubts are in 
the way that we have implemented that, that we don’t tend to think in that way.  
(Representative for the World Bank). 
I got the impression that the subject of education for citizenship was not seen as critical 
enough. If so, it is difficult to imagine that it will contribute in the desired direction. 
Connected to this, some of my informants drew the lines to political education, as it 
was conducted earlier in the form of propaganda for the existing power elites: 
For [the government] (…), education for citizenship is speaking or explaining 
the people that the good situation is the one that we are living in now. You 
don’t change anything, because democracy is this that we are living in now. 
But if we have the opposition parties, they say, this is not education for 
citizenship, it is political education. We must make the difference between 
education for citizenship and political education, (…). In education for 
citizenship, you must not involve in political issues. You must stay in limit 
between government and the political; you must stay independent for the 
power.  
(Representative for civil society). 
When my informants called this political education, they use the term opposite to the 
way Harber (2002) uses it in chapter 6. The political education that they refer to is 
more in concordance with what Harber calls political indoctrination or - socialization. 
But their point is in concordance with Harber’s; they are concerned about the extent to 
which education for citizenship can be exploited for other means, and this is of course 
also connected to the undemocratic practices mentioned earlier. A new subject of 
education for citizenship that does not contribute to a critical consciousness will 
neither contribute to democratization and changes in the Mozambican society, as I see 
it. 
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7.3.3 Which role does education for citizenship play in the 
Mozambican context?  
In the preceding I have addressed the main question for this thesis: Which role does 
education for citizenship play in the Mozambican context? It seems like a clear 
tendency that the education for citizenship in Mozambique will contribute to 
conveying values for co-existence. Tradition, culture and political history play a role 
here; the traditional values are deeply embedded in the Mozambican’s understanding 
of the subject. The recent conflicts, the war and the re-building of the country have 
contributed further to this emphasis, as unity, dialogue, patriotism and common values 
are of great importance for the rebuilding of the nation, in concordance with the 
theoretical outline in chapter 6. But this conveyance of values might become 
problematic, if a democratic objective is not part of the Mozambican society’s aims. I 
have therefore emphasized the critical aspect of education for citizenship. A few of my 
informants had a strong awareness concerning this issue, but this was opposite to the 
main tendency within my material. My informants were vague while reflecting on the 
topic, and they often ended up talking about something else. It seemed to me that the 
focus on co-existence blurred and repressed the importance of the critical aspect, and 
this resulted in a somewhat “naïve” understanding of the critical aspect. Their 
reflections often turned into explanations and excuses as to why this was a difficult 
matter, and cultural reasons as well as the present situation of poverty were 
emphasized. Overall, I got an impression that the critical aspect of education got minor 
attention. It also seemed to be a lack of conscious thinking on the matter. If this does 
not reflect a fear of freedom or a society of naïve consciousness, according to the terms 
of Freire (1974; 2000), it does nevertheless seem to be a downsizing of the importance 
of criticism and the creation of critical consciousness.  
It might be that the focus on nation building leads to a neglect of the critical aspect. It 
is appropriate to consider whether it is realistic and fair to presuppose a critical aspect 
in the education for citizenship in a country like Mozambique. It might be too great a 
demand that the Mozambicans should be encouraged to be critical and in opposition, 
when there is still so much to be done, demanding a unified effort. Herein lays a 
responsibility for the development aid partners, as it could be that this resembles a 
justification for certain conditionalities. I have emphasized that Mozambique is a 
nation that lacks democratic experience. This might have created an environment 
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where criticism is not natural, and there is therefore also the possibility that people do 
not dare to consider a situation where criticism would fundamentally collide with the 
government’s view. One might ask oneself if this could resemble the kind of apathy 
that Freire (2000) describes within a culture of silence, where the people passively 
accept reality as something out of their control to change.   
For this reason, I miss the critical aspect of education, and I am concerned that this 
lack of awareness concerning the critical aspect might have negative impact on the 
Mozambican education for citizenship and its ability to contribute to democratization. 
Some of my informants also criticized the new subject of education for citizenship for 
not being critical enough. Had the critical aspect been more present, the dilemma of a 
conveyance of values would not be a dilemma to such a great extent. But as the critical 
aspect to some extent is missing, one can more easily understand the posing of 
conditionalities, and why there is a limit to what the development aid partners can 
accept. The critical aspect of education is important for the political culture of 
Mozambique, not only in order to control the government, but also to provide a better 
understanding of the implications of and mechanisms within the development aid 
relationship.  
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8. CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this thesis has been to explore which role education for citizenship 
plays in the Mozambican context. In a study like this, clear and straightforward 
conclusions are difficult to uphold. There are nevertheless some tendencies that I find 
interesting. First, I will sum up the empirical and theoretical results of the investigation 
of my research questions, and then I provide some concluding remarks.  
8.1 Summary of the investigation of my research questions 
When addressing my first sub-question What characterizes the present Mozambican 
democracy and the transition it goes through?, I have support from literature studies 
when claiming that Mozambique’s present democracy is characterized by the people’s 
lack of democratic experience. The colonial era, the liberation war, the one-party 
regime and the period of destabilization have all sustained this lack of democratic 
experience, which becomes evident in the present development of multi-party 
elections. My empirical data reveal similar results: The present Mozambican 
democracy is characterized by being an improving process, but nevertheless with 
important obstacles. For instance are people’s misunderstandings of the term 
democracy one important reason for the difficulties experienced in the process. These 
misunderstandings are often based in differences between the Western democratic 
ideal and local culture. Traditional beliefs in authoritarian structures and respect for the 
elders result in an elite democracy where one has to be eternally grateful to the persons 
in power. I have also found that the misunderstandings of the term democracy are 
based in the historical events of Mozambique, as for instance the era of a one-party 
regime has led to a continuation of the understanding of democracy as elite-rule, and to 
difficulties in the perception of multi-party elections. Undemocratic practices in the 
Mozambican society are an important characteristic as well. They function as an 
obstacle to democracy, as my data show that corruption and propaganda characterize 
the political agenda. An important characteristic in this respect is the limited 
participation of civil society, as I have found that there seems to be discrepancy in the 
opinions of how this participation should be sustained. This functions as another 
obstacle for further democratization. Poverty is the last obstacle to democracy, and my 
final characteristic of the Mozambican society. My data suggest that poverty might 
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influence the concept that people have of democracy, their self-confidence as self-
governors, and also the extent to which there are resources available to sustain the 
most democratic solutions. I have argued that these obstacles to democratization, as 
well as the overall lack of democratic experience, demands information and education 
for citizenship. 
When it comes to the concrete transition into democracy, I first emphasized the term 
democracy in the literature review. Democracy theorists have divergent understandings 
of the term, and it can certainly be applied differently to different contexts. There are 
implications of the African context that need to be taken into consideration when a 
democracy is to be created in Mozambique, and a more dynamic definition of 
democracy, bound to take care of contextual differences, is necessary in the present 
situation in Mozambique. A pure transfer of the Western type democracy is not a 
sustainable manner of democratization, both according to literature studies and 
empirical data. Nevertheless, my empirical data show that the Mozambican transition 
into democracy can be characterized as a pure transfer of the Western type democracy. 
My informants crave a democracy where the Mozambican context is taken into 
account. They emphasize that a pure transfer is not desirable, but that aid dependency 
forces this reality. 
Since the powerful development agents play a significant role in this transfer, and 
contribute heavily on the overall policy agenda of Mozambique, the second research 
question naturally was: What characterizes the development aid partnership in this 
context? The external partners play an important role in encouraging and securing a 
democratic development. But my literature studies show that development aid is an 
issue of great controversies and dilemmas. The new Sector Wide Approaches and the 
rhetoric of partnership and local ownership are warmly welcomed in this context, and 
seem to entail positive features that could deal with some of the problems inherent in 
the aid relationship, and provide good means for democratization. This, however, 
depends on whether the development aid partnership functions according to its 
intentions, and reality shows that the aid relationship is also characterized by features 
that could function as obstacles to a democracy: Democratization is emphasized by the 
development aid agents as a means of development. But the same agents make use of 
undemocratic methods in their work, as conditionalities connected to aid have been 
common, and still are, even after the rhetorical change within the new aid approach. 
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My empirical data concord with this, as it shows that my informants are positive to the 
SWAp, and view it as a step forward for a genuine partnership. There is nevertheless 
also a tendency within my material that the partnership is not seen to function 
according to its intentions. My data show that this might be explained by the fact that it 
is a cross-cultural partnership, and cultural differences might lead to divergent 
understandings and opinions. Other difficulties with the SWAp seem to be 
disagreements on the outcome of increased cooperation between donors. Some 
emphasize that this makes policy more credible, while others argue that it leads to less 
room for negotiation for the government, a questionable degree of local ownership, 
and a debatable degree of shared responsibility. Even though my informants argued 
that they were pleased with the level of local ownership, this looked different 
connected to the FTI. Overall, the aid relationship is not a genuine partnership at all 
times, but is rather characterized by a lack of trust between the partners. As of now, I 
am of the opinion that one might question whether the development aid partnership can 
be characterized as democratic. It is not solely favourable for the ordinary 
Mozambicans, and one might question whether it functions as another obstacle to 
democracy. The Mozambicans should themselves be able to understand and control the 
impact that the development aid agents have on the national policy of their country. 
The active participation in this process demands education for citizenship. 
As I have argued that education for citizenship is needed in the present situation in 
Mozambique, my last and main research question becomes important: Which role does 
education for citizenship play in the Mozambican context? Through the theoretical 
outline I have argued that there are at least two aspects of education relevant in this 
context: Education for citizenship will include socialization into the political culture of 
a democratic society, through the conveyance of the values and the culture inherent in 
that society. This is important, as education for citizenship plays a role when it comes 
to nation building, especially in a multiethnic society like Mozambique. Education is 
also put forward as a change agent, through emphasis on the critical aspect of 
education for citizenship; the creation of a critical consciousness for participation in 
democracy.  These two aspects are not necessarily conflicting, but their co-existence 
depends on the aims of society. In my empirical data there is a tendency of strong 
emphasis on the aspect of socialization. Education for citizenship plays a role as a 
conveyer of values for co-existence. The traditions of ubuntu and palaver play a role in 
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this respect, and become important in a society coming from conflicts and war. 
Overall, I can imagine that the aspect of socialization and conveyance of common 
values will be taken care of through the Mozambican educational plans. But the 
justification of the conveyance of values depends on the aims and values of a society, 
and since Mozambique is characterized by a lack of democratic experience, and by a 
range of obstacles to democratization, one might ask whether this justification is 
present. Some of my informants actually criticized the way that the new subject of 
education for citizenship was implemented. But the tendency in my empirical data is 
that there is a lack of consciousness concerning the critical aspect of education. This is 
in itself an illustration of why the justification of conveyance of values might become 
difficult.  Many of my informants were vague while reflecting on the critical aspect, 
and it seemed like they preferred to come up with explanations and excuses as to why 
it was a difficult matter. To me, it seems like the focus on co-existence represses the 
importance of the critical aspect. This results in a somewhat naïve view on the 
problems with the existence of disagreements and different beliefs, which might be 
both an indicator of the lack of democratic experience and also one of the reasons for a 
possible continued lack of democratic experience, as I see it. The lack of awareness 
concerning the critical aspect might be a danger for the continued democratization of 
Mozambique.  
8.2 Concluding remarks 
Democratization as development aid in Mozambique seems to have inherent dilemmas. 
The state of the present Mozambican democracy might require that some 
conditionalities are set, to secure a just development and a viable democracy. 
Simultaneously adjustment to the Mozambican context and emphasis on local 
ownership are required for the same purposes. The Mozambican people should be in 
charge of the development of their own country. They should be able to influence and 
control their own government, and they should be able to trust that the development 
aid partnership functions in a democratic manner, according to the wishes of the 
Mozambicans.  
For the Mozambicans to take this role as participating citizens in a democratic society, 
the creation of a critical and enlightened public is decisive. I have argued that 
education for citizenship is instrumental in this respect, and I have especially 
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emphasized the critical aspect of education. This could be the tool that the 
Mozambican people need in this process, and the external partners play an important 
role in encouraging and securing this. My material has nevertheless showed that it can 
be questioned to what degree the Mozambican society is ready for these changes at this 
point. I am thus not of the opinion that education for citizenship will solve all the 
problems in Mozambique, or that the critical aspect of education could be forced upon 
them. I nevertheless insist on the importance of awareness concerning this matter in 
the situation that Mozambique is in. If so, the critical aspect of education for 
citizenship might become a tool for the Mozambican people to influence not only their 
own government, but also the powerful development agents that have such a great 
impact on their country. 
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10.  APPENDIX 
Appendix 1: Interview guide 
Questions concerning the SWAp and the process of making the ESSP: 
• Has your organization/institution participated in the process?  
• How have you influenced the process? 
• Have all stakeholders been included in the process? How do you value this? 
• How did the process start?  
• How do you find the change into Sector Wide Approach compared to earlier aid 
approaches? Conditionalities/Power relations?  
• How has the cooperation between the government and local institutions 
functioned?  
• How has the cooperation between the donors and between the donors and other 
stakeholders functioned?  
 
Questions concerning the ESSP and education for citizenship:  
• What do you mean should be the goal of the ESSP? Poverty reduction; individual 
development?  
• Does the plan lack any important goals? 
• How important is Education for Citizenship for attaining this goal?  
• Have there been any changes in the new plan from 2004? 
 
• What do you understand by Education for Citizenship? 
• How do you value Education for Citizenship?  
• How much is this emphasized in the ESSP?  
• How important is the local context in connection to education and education for 
citizenship; and how do you think this has been taken care of?  
• What problems do you see in the fact that the majority of people do not speak 
Portuguese? How do you view the issue of language of instruction? 
 
Questions concerning democracy: 
• What does democracy mean to you? In the Mozambican context?  
• Can there be different understandings of the term? Is this visible through the co-
operation with the different partners? 
• Is democracy a goal? 
• How do you evaluate the state of democracy in Mozambique today? 
• Which role do you think Education for Citizenship should have in the present 
Mozambican society? How do you view the dilemma of the creation of a critical 
consciousness versus education for learning common values?   
 
 
